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The Public Work 
The public work submitted for the award of a Doctorate in Professional Studies is Keystone 
Development Trust, as an organization and portfolio of socio-economic interventions. 
While Keystone is presented as the overarching public work, a range of public works that 
support the submission are presented in evidence such as publications and innovative 
projects. Therefore, my claim is based on:  
i. An organization is a public work 
ii. Demonstrable outcomes of an organization are public works 
iii. Entrepreneurial third sector organizations span community, public and 
market institutional logics and are sites of experimentation, creativity and 
learning which informs future practice 
iv. While organizations are co-created through the interplay of context, ideas 
and individual and collective action, to create an organization in a poor, 
rural context required that I was at the ‘leading edge’ of professional 
practice that included:  
 Reinterpreting, transforming and translating knowledge in a new context  
 Dissemination of new knowledge and approaches in the creation of the 
public work through publications, consultancy practice and engagement 
in policy and practitioner forums. 
My central claim is that to build an organization that simultaneously delivers social impact 
and financial sustainability requires continual organizational and institutional work at the 
individual, organizational, community and societal levels. This is demonstrated through a 
retrospective framework that combines:  
i. Critiquing and reconceptualizing the institutions that frame the development 
trust and social enterprise models 
ii. An overview and reflections on the journey of organizational and 
institutional work in developing and sustaining the public work; an 
entrepreneurial third sector organization 
iii. An overview and reflection on supporting evidence, including the following 
public works:  
  a. Trust documents 
  b. Publications (sole and co-authored) 
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  c. Consultancy reports 
  d. Films 
  e. Projects. 
In retrospect, as Chapter 2 reflects, my journey is one of contending with personal and 
professional paradoxical tensions. In Chapter 3 the public work is presented within a 
framework that reflects the key phases in Keystone’s organizational development:  
 Framing and forming 2003 
 Entrepreneurial foundations 2004-07 
 Approaching sustainability 2007-10 
 Innovation within austerity 2010-12 
Chapter 4 provides concluding reflections on the public work. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2003, when appointed Chief Executive of a new development trust charged with 
delivering holistic solutions to entrenched social problems and achieving financial 
sustainability through enterprise (rather than public subsidy) within three years, I was 
immediately struck by a dilemma which has challenged and driven me ever since: how is it 
possible in a poor place? While delivering a major public funded programme was the 
pressing priority, I was acutely aware that a flood of public monies did not necessarily 
result in sustainable organizations or community infrastructure when regeneration schemes 
ended. Moreover, relatively short ‘big bang’ programmes rarely lived up to the 
transformation claims made at project inception (Stott, M.1 et al. 2009). Twenty years as a 
community development manager and practitioner had taught me that making a difference 
in poor places required relationships forged over time through interventions that mattered 
to local people. I was determined that the new Trust would be in it for the long haul, 
although at the time I was not entirely sure how. Furthermore I was concerned that policy 
and practitioner discourses on development trusts, social entrepreneurship and social 
enterprise were heavy on rhetoric and messianic fervour, but short on a critical 
understanding and practical solutions to the dilemma (Stott, 2005). 
Keystone Development Trust2 was established in the Thetford area to be the successor of a 
public sector led regeneration partnership midway through a Single Regeneration Budget 
(SRB) programme and integral to a bid for European Objective 2 (EO2) funding. The area 
faced entrenched deprivation, predominantly due to the legacy of massive social housing 
programmes (London overspill) and changes to the rural economy.3 Following visits to 
flagship trusts, the Partnership Board had been persuaded by influential actors that the 
model of a not-for-profit organization aiming to achieve social and economic regeneration 
through creating wealth and opportunity, keeping returns within the community and being 
owned and managed by the community, would be a sustainable option. The legal form of 
trusts varies, and in Keystone’s case a charitable company had been established.  
On arrival, I found a complex, messy situation with competing demands and little clarity or 
consensus on organizational objectives or how to achieve them (KDT, 2003a). As Weick 
                                                            
1 For clarification, I am referenced as ‘Stott’. ‘Stott, M.’ is a co-author of a number of the public works.  
2 Registered as Keystone Community Partnership; the name was changed to Keystone Development Trust as 
part of the process described in Chapter 3. 
3 See Keystone Community Profile (2005) http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/common/pdfs/ 
keystoneprofile2ndedition.pdf 
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(1985) suggests, making sense of a mess requires making connections and formulating the 
problems. What appeared most urgent threatened to overshadow reflection and the sense 
making process – not least financial over commitment; collapse of proposed capital 
projects and taking on accountable status. The immediate delivery of significant 
programmes with punishing timescales had to be achieved within a new organization bereft 
of policy and procedures. There were major staff issues and complex governance 
arrangements to contend with. Public disquiet on its predecessor’s performance and 
confusion around future intentions also added to the mix; an away day participant 
described the Trust as ‘over promised and under delivering’ (KDT, 2003a). Moreover, I 
got the impression that public partners perceived the Trust as a means to continue 
channelling resources to their projects; a ‘front’ rather than a social innovator. However, it 
was the model which increasingly concerned me. 
For Moulaert et al., social innovation combines the satisfaction of human needs, changes in 
social relations, increasing socio-political capacity, access to resources and empowerment 
(2005: 1976). The premise of the development trust model was rooted in the idea that, 
given state and market failure in poor places, social innovation was best achieved through 
integrated bottom up interventions across multiple domains (such as housing, health, 
economy and education). Ontologically it resonated with my experience, but 
simultaneously delivering social impact and sustaining it through wealth creation appeared 
a particularly challenging paradoxical problem riddled with potential tensions around 
governance, focus, organization, delivery, reception and what, if anything, could be 
sustained. Luscher and Lewis argue that in sense making driven by organizational change, 
managers need to provide ‘workable certainty’ to avoid confusion, stress and paralysis 
(2008: 221). For most partners, Trustees and staff, the workable certainty was focusing on 
managing programme delivery in the ‘traditional’ style: deliver projects until the monies 
runs out and bid for more of the same. Finding order, making change, delivering quality 
services and following the ‘poverty pound’ elsewhere when the public money dried up in 
2007 was an option, but not one that I felt comfortable with. Instead, I embarked on a ‘dog 
with a bone’ strategy to problematize and make sense of the model which Smallbone et al. 
(2001) portrayed as having the potential to generate an innovative synthesis. 
Reflecting on the experience of creating a public work, Keystone Development Trust, my 
approach to social innovation combined mutually reinforcing organizational work, 
institutional work and socio-economic interventions. Institutions are formal and informal 
constructs which inform, shape or regulate individual and organizational behaviour such as 
rules, laws, codes, habits and expectations; for Scott, institutions provide ‘stability and 
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meaning to social life’ (2008: 48). Organizations are groups of actors structured to achieve 
certain objectives within boundaries ‘that foster distinctions and dichotomies’ (Smith and 
Lewis, 2011: 388). Institutional work is ‘the purposive action of individuals and 
organizations aimed at creating, maintaining and disrupting institutions’ (Lawrence and 
Suddaby, 2006: 215). Following Lawrence and Suddaby, organizational work can be 
characterized as the purposive action of individuals and groups aimed at creating, 
maintaining and disrupting organizations. Socio-economic interventions are the projects 
and activities delivered by organizations for their beneficiaries to fulfil organizational 
mission. 
 
Figure 1.1: Mutually reinforcing work 
In choosing what to do, how, with whom and within what timescale, organizing creates 
tensions and competing institutional and organizational demands. Tensions may be tackled 
by treating them as a puzzle, dilemma, trade-off or a paradox. As a puzzle, tensions need to 
be better understood and an optimal solution found. A dilemma usually has two possible 
incompatible solutions therefore a choice has to be made. In a trade-off approach, there are 
numerous potential solutions and the ideal is to find a balance between conflicting 
pressures. In a paradox, opposite positions appear equally valid and apparently 
incompatible, but both have to be managed or reconciled. There are no answers but 
contingent ‘innovative reconciliations’ (De Wit and Meyer, 2004: 2004: 15). From a 
paradox perspective organizations face increasing complexity, diversity, rapid change and 
conflicting demands which need to be attended to simultaneously to achieve long term 
sustainability. Lewis argues that organizations are inherently paradoxical and ‘embroiled in 
Organizational Work
Socio‐economic 
interventionsInstitutional Work
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tensions’ (2000: 760). Smith and Lewis (2011) identify four categories of paradoxes: 
learning, belonging, organizing and performing. Learning paradoxes arise through change 
and tensions between the old and new – ‘a struggle between the comfort of the past and the 
uncertainty of the future’ (Lewis, 2000: 766). Belonging paradoxes are tensions of identity 
between individuals, groups and the collective. Control or flexibility are central to 
organizing paradoxes, while performing paradoxes ‘stem from the plurality of 
stakeholders...and competing strategies and goals’ (Smith and Lewis, 2011: 384). 
Performing tensions are created when choosing what to do. Organizing tensions stem from 
decisions how to operate. Belonging tensions arise from who does what and learning 
tensions from timing. 
The public work presented for the award of Doctorate in Professional Studies chart a 
personal and organizational journey attempting to problematize, understand, communicate 
and overcome the paradoxical tensions inherent in the dual goals of social and wealth 
creation enshrined in the organizational purpose of development trusts (Stott, 2005; Stott 
and Tracey, 2007). The doctorate provides an opportunity to reflect on my sustained 
contribution through the conceptual lens of institutional work and the organizational work 
literatures as well as a paradox perspective on approaching organizational tensions. 
Confronting the paradoxical tensions facing a new trust and undertaking organizational and 
institutional work to simultaneously tackle competing demands and deliver innovative 
interventions, frames the work presented here. 
The social entrepreneurial literature often privileges the role of heroic individuals or 
organizations. Social heroes are often credited with shaman like powers to conjure socially 
valuable innovations and assume the status of ‘thought leaders’ (O’Conner, 2006: 80). The 
value and virtue of third sector organizations are often assumed merely by adding ‘social’ 
or ‘community’. I make no such claim for myself or the Trust I manage, tempting as it may 
be (Stott, 2004). Zietsma and McKnight’s work on the processes involved in the co-
creation of institutions which include ‘ongoing negotiations, experimentation, competition 
and learning’ (2009: 145) provides a useful framework for reflection on the public works. 
Organizations are also co-created and not purely the product of individual leaders or 
managers, rather the complex interplay of organizational context, ideas and individual and 
collective action of internal and external stakeholders. Indeed, co-creation is a central motif 
of my approach to tackling the paradoxes facing the Trust and in the creation of the public 
work. 
With the Trust almost a decade old and facing new challenges, I thought the Doctorate in 
Professional Studies would provide an opportunity to reflect on the influences and learning 
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prior to joining as well as reflecting on the experience of tackling the paradoxical tensions 
the Trust faces. The following chapter explores my experience before joining Keystone 
and how it contributed to my development and thinking. Chapter 3 critically examines 
Keystone as a public work and the concluding chapter provides a critical reflection on the 
public works. 
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2. Public Entrepreneurship: 
Negotiating between policing and pirating 
 
On joining Keystone I was eager to lead an organization and apply the experience and 
learning from twenty years of practising and managing community development, but 
somewhat daunted by having to achieve an organizational mission through developing 
entrepreneurial activities. I considered myself as a reasonably effective public entrepreneur 
in the sense of risk taking, securing legitimacy and resources to achieve community 
development goals within local authorities, but having no business experience, not as a 
social entrepreneur. On reflection, my personal and organizational journey had equipped 
me better than I had thought. 
On leaving Canterbury City Council in 2003, the Head of Legal Services opined that there 
were two types of people in organizations: pirates and police. The latter provided order and 
played by the rules; the former created chaos and broke (or least bent) rules. ‘At first,’ he 
continued, ‘I thought you were a pirate, now I realise you are both’. I suspect most are, to a 
greater or lesser extent, who are engaged in the institutional and organizational work of 
creating, maintaining and disrupting simultaneously. However, his statement captured the 
tensions I felt inherent in practising and managing community development within 
organizations as well as my own approach and character; not least enjoying the fluidity and 
risks of change making while wanting to order messy organizations or create boundaries to 
behaviour. According to Mason, public entrepreneurs in the public sector are ‘rare animals’ 
and an anti-entrepreneurial attitude ‘could well contribute to, and explain, lack of 
achievement in public bodies’ (2006: 49). Mason identifies characteristic behaviours of a 
public entrepreneur:4 risk taking; divergent thinking; focus; personal responsibility and 
learning from experience (ibid). I would argue that personal responsibility, an ‘internal 
locus of control’ (ibid: 50), and accountability coupled with coherent values are of 
particular importance. 
Making sense and then organizing change within complex contexts, supporting others in 
doing so, had been central to my career, as had a passionate commitment to public service, 
community development values as well as somewhat thinly disguised anger in the face of 
poverty, inequality and exploitation. Trying to make a difference and holding to an ethic of 
reciprocity (‘do to others as you would have others do to you’) had been guiding principles 
                                                            
4 Although Mason prefers ‘public innovator’ to overcome ‘negative connotations’ of entrepreneurship (2006: 
49). 
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since volunteering in a Dr Barnardo’s home, resettling children from the ‘mental handicap’ 
hospitals in the late 1970s. A visit to a hospital and witnessing the impact of an 
exclusionary total institution (Goffman, 1961) on children who then blossomed in a caring 
environment made the injustices I detected in society tangible. Inspired by the commitment 
of the Barnardo’s staff who patiently re-socialized damaged children, doing felt as 
important as thinking about issues. My grammar school privileged public service, 
leadership and team work; preparation for establishment leadership roles. While 
internalizing much of the ethos, since turning down a place at the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst (awarded at 16), I had begun to challenge norms, behaviours and authority; 
teenage arrogance tinged with early sociological instincts to understand why rather than 
accept received wisdom.5  
Subsequent political activity and early community work experiences led me to believe that 
maintaining compassion and commitment was of equal importance as career building. Too 
much distance from the people and places I served in could lead to complacency and 
policy solutions not grounded in the everyday experience of challenged communities. 
Taking the course of least resistance did not feel like an option; working with people and 
communities was never easy, tidy or always successful and took time and stamina. So did 
persuading organizations to invest in painstaking, long-term work that engaged, politicized 
and might challenge the organization, rather than quick fix projects or punitive social 
policy. Being a thorn inside the organization felt a virtue as a community development 
practitioner rather than an adult version of ‘oppositional defiance disorder’, as a social 
worker colleague once suggested. 6 As virtues can rapidly become vices and personal 
history can veer towards hagiography, reflexivity is crucial. While the challenges and 
associated tensions I have faced remain relatively consistent over time (some depressingly 
so, such as persistent poverty or racism) as well as the context (predominantly poorer 
places) and community development techniques, I have attempted to constantly learn, 
reflect and act; crucially, challenging my own assumptions as well as others in an attempt 
to problematize, crystallize, apply and refine community interventions.  
I began community work during a placement year during my BA Peace Studies degree, 
developing an unemployment centre. Following graduation I ran a community centre in 
Kings Cross and projects for Mencap, Elfrida Rathbone and Contact-a-Family, with 
                                                            
5 To the chagrin of my teachers I moved from being an exemplary Deputy Head Boy, senior cadet NCO, etc, 
to what one school report described as ‘barrack room lawyer’ and ‘thinks he is more able than he actually is’, 
followed by suspension: an early lesson in how non-conformity has consequences within organizations. 
6 ‘Oppositional defiant disorder is a pattern of disobedient, hostile, and defiant behavior toward authority 
figures'. US National Library of Medicine, http: //www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0002504/ 
Accessed 22/3/12. 
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children and young people with special needs while volunteering with an ex-offenders 
charity and Undercurrents, a radical environmental magazine. I was attracted to localized 
interventions with stigmatized groups and unpopular issues. I was particularly influenced 
by Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid (1939) and Field, Factories and Workshops Tomorrow (1974), 
Sale’s Human Scale (1980) and non-statist traditions such as social anarchism, guild 
socialism and the cooperative movement. The community development ethos of starting 
where people were and working on issues important to them, however mundane, building 
solidarity and political skills, appealed. 
A key issue at the time was the integration of the ‘mentally handicapped’ into mainstream 
organizations and communities. Resistance to change was strong, particularly within host 
organizations that benefited from segregation and influential parents within governance 
structures. I rapidly learnt three key lessons. Firstly, hosts may articulate a community 
development ethos of ‘bottom up’, but actually adopt a directive ‘top down’ approach to 
meet organizational rather than community objectives. Secondly, community workers with 
overt political agendas or low tolerance to frustration could become manipulative when 
baulked. This lesson was reinforced later in a community development team in Cambridge, 
some of whose ideology on how women should be politicized and on what to focus 
(challenging patriarchy) got in the way of what local women actually wanted to achieve 
(removing dog faeces from parks). Although tempted, I felt being a community worker 
was a privileged and relatively powerful position; if the urge to impose ideas or order was 
not checked, it was both an abuse of power and did not actually facilitate lasting change. 
Thirdly, resistance to change within organizations or communities was underpinned by 
fear: fear of the unknown, losing power, resources or control (Stott and Longhurst, 2011). 
Just because a change was rational, could bring future benefits or just was not necessarily 
sufficient to overcome such fears. Whether a change agenda was from the top or bottom, 
unless participants perceived a ‘workable certainty’ (Luscher and Lewis, 2008: 221), no 
amount of directives or cajoling would work.  
Working in the Community Development Service at Cambridge City Council (1987-2000) 
I believe I made a significant, if relatively localized, contribution to practice, the 
organization and communities served. I learnt that community development is an 
inherently challenging activity and surprisingly difficult to do well. It focuses on 
‘empowerment’ and recognizing that some have access to resources, opportunity, skills 
and capacity and others do not. Communities were not just places, but were also about 
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identity and interest; people belonged to multiple communities (Stott, M. et al., 2009: 18).7 
Communities were messy, cacophonic and conflicted; there were myriad voices, needs and 
issues; it was relatively rare for communities I worked in (rather than a few ‘leaders’) to 
crystallize around shared needs and issues and take action. Communities tended to be 
based on loose or ad hoc connections of place, friendship or activities (Brint, 2001). When 
it occurred, convergence was usually to confront a direct threat. Community development 
done well was a patient strategy as it requires time, perseverance and a willingness to 
listen and make changes by the sponsor agency. Building relationships and trust through 
commitment, empathy and delivering on promises was crucial within the council and 
communities. Personal qualities and the ability to connect with anyone were equally as 
important as professional knowledge. Community development was a political strategy 
recognizing that change requires collective action, and on occasions those with power and 
influence do not like to share (Stott, 2009). 
Within a local authority, to deliver interventions that target what communities actually 
want rather than others feel they need, practitioners have to engage in constant 
organizational and institutional work. Bauman argues the state presides over distinctions of 
order/chaos, law/lawlessness, belonging/exclusion and useful/useless (2004: 33); the 
‘gardener’ state converts and cultivates ‘wild’ people, culture and places (1987: 67). This 
‘gardening’ tendency permeates councils. Institutional norms, codes and rules privilege 
certain behaviours in public discourse and decision making, as well as professional 
knowledge and solutions. The ‘wild’ people and places, predominantly social housing, are 
viewed as the ‘other’, subject to a panoptical gaze and control interspersed with missionary 
efforts to improve and ‘behave in an orderly fashion in a well-ordered society’ (Bauman, 
1998: 84). From the institutional logics perspective, the state is as an institutional order 
alongside market, religion, family, professions and corporation with distinct sources of 
legitimacy, authority, control mechanisms and strategy. Institutional orders shape and are 
shaped by individuals and organizations. Institutional orders within an inter-institutional 
system cohabit, compete and conflict. For Thornton et al., community is also an 
institutional order (2012: 73). Marquis and Battilana (2007) argue that community 
influence on organizations has been underestimated in institutional theory. Thornton et al. 
suggest that communities are the ‘mediators of performance and growth’ and a potential 
                                                            
7 Community is a contested term and hard to define. Common usage stresses the positive and normative 
assumptions around cohesion, stability and behaviour; that transgression can lead to exclusion or worse is 
often ignored. For a full discussion see Stott, M. et al., 2009.  
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alternative to extant organizations (2012: 70).8 However, the institutions of poorer places 
and communities and the local state not only conflict, but the resources available to resist, 
mediate or create alternatives are often, in my experience, limited or at least latent. 
The ‘top down’ gardening tendencies of the local state and ‘bottom up’ philosophy of 
community development practitioners make uncomfortable bedfellows. Even though they 
are on the institutional and organizational periphery, as ‘embedded actors’, community 
development practitioners have conflicting institutional logics to local authorities and their 
constituent professions. Institutional logics are ‘socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules (Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 
804). They provide coherent guidelines for action (Besharov and Smith, n.d). There is an 
inherent tension in being an agent of the local state and a community worker; indeed, some 
believe it an untenable position and part of the problem, not the solution. 
In 1989, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities’ Community Development: The Local 
Authority Role made a valiant attempt to promote an enabling, not just servicing, logic to 
communities, focusing on institutional and organizational concerns, 9  in other words 
enhancing existing institutions and organizations to enable the excluded to benefit (Marti 
and Mair, 2009) while strengthening local state legitimacy. In my view, a community 
oriented ‘public entrepreneur’10 potentially has access to resources unavailable to third 
sector colleagues; negotiates both contexts; can balance competing demands and makes a 
significant impact. This entails integrating both logics into one’s repertoire (Besharov and 
Smith, n.d). Lacking material resources initially, practitioners employ cultural tools and 
social relationships to confront, challenge, amend or ameliorate institutions, social or 
organizational practices (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Given that a dominant institutional 
logic in local authorities is a democratic process and community development practitioners 
occupy numerous social locations, mobilizing community actors to ‘reinterpret and 
manipulate prevailing symbols and practices’ (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008: 115) is a 
pragmatic strategy. Following Tracey, this institutional and organizational persuasion 
incorporates community building (shared identity), ‘strategic use of emotion’ (compassion 
and empathy) and ‘strategic use of theatre’ (spectacle) (2012: 6). 
                                                            
8 This is an important insight in the context of the recent policy emphasis on localism and Big Society 
volunteerism. Leaving the financial imperative to one side, encouraging communities to organise services 
could fundamentally alter the relationship between community and state. 
9 This paper and Local Authorities and Community Development: A Strategic Opportunity in the 1990s 
(AMA, 1993) heavily influenced my approach to working with a local authority and provided conceptual 
frameworks that colleagues and I used to develop and grow the Cambridge service. Although dated, they 
remain pertinent. I still use their model of the crucial differences between public information, consultation 
and participation in local authorities today.  
10 Not a term I would have used at the time. 
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Insights that, in retrospect, underpinned much of my future work occurred while 
attempting to set up yet another committee of young parents to run much needed childcare 
provision on a working class estate. Being cash poor, mainstream provision was 
unaffordable. To achieve legitimacy and resources, local governance was essential. 
Moreover, it was a community development tenet that people should self-organize to 
develop skills and capacity for engaging with power structures. Even with support, to set 
up and maintain the provision required substantial voluntary time from women who were 
time poor, juggling family responsibilities with low-paid jobs. It struck me that while 
middle-class people paid for others to organize services, working class communities were 
expected to organize their own to access public largesse or be heard (Stott and Longhurst, 
2010: 104). 
The Council determined the norms of engagement and legitimized collectives that fitted or 
mirrored its own governance, priorities and timescales (in particular, relatively short 
political horizons) to create order through accommodation and assimilation. 11  While 
empowerment and collective action were important to make lasting change, ‘bottom up’ 
approaches that purely extended the reach of the local state were not necessarily 
challenging power structures or meeting a need. I came to the conclusion that ‘doing for’ 
communities was a valid middle way strategy, as long as it was rooted in needs articulated 
by the target communities and a means to an end, not an end in itself. For instance, if 
childcare was a necessity to enable work, why spend months setting it up when it was 
‘bread and butter’ to a community worker? Securing income for poorer households was 
surely more important than deferring to the isomorphic pressures of advocates of pure 
‘bottom up’ community development. Young and Willmott’s seminal 1957 community 
study referred to a ‘springboard’ approach, facilitating activities as means to deliver 
immediate interventions and opportunities for future engagement which resonated and I 
incorporated it into organizational practice at Cambridge, Canterbury and Keystone. Not 
immune from frustration, wanting to force the pace of change or engage in bigger issues 
than dog fouling, I found the springboard approach demonstrated new opportunities to 
communities, identified potential activists and proved to be a catalyst for change. The 
second conclusion was the need to experiment with more innovative forms of engagement 
in order to; reach people who had neither the time nor the inclination to participate in 
traditional structures; and embrace the messiness and cacophony of communities and 
challenge institutional norms. 
                                                            
11 Examples include tenants committees, youth councils and neighbourhood committees. 
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Two innovations that had particular impact and demonstrated a combination of 
institutional and organizational work with social interventions (as well as the strategic use 
of emotions and theatre) are the Racial Harassment Public Inquiry and Young Person’s 
Citizen Jury on which I worked as a Principal Officer (Community Services) in the late 
1990s. The motivation was to generate political and public legitimacy for change. I had 
recently taken on the management of the Racial Harassment Service, which was 
experiencing an upsurge in complaints but was not dealing effectively with them. The 
Citizen’s Jury emerged from engagement with young people in the community centres and 
neighbourhood services I managed. I led the Public Inquiry process and coordinated the 
Citizen’s Jury with the Assistant Chief Executive. The former attempted to combine the 
more traditional planning inquiry or social commission approach, where political leaders 
take evidence from experts and groups representing black and minority communities, with 
evidence gathered from individuals through focus groups, interviews and questionnaires. 
The latter turned the model on its head with young people hearing evidence from adults, 
deliberating and making recommendations.  
The Inquiry was a conscious attempt to challenge the norms and rules governing tackling 
racial harassment at the time; not least overt racism in white communities, covert within 
agencies and lack of confidence (therefore under-reporting) from the black and minority 
community. It was also aimed at legitimizing organizational change, priority and access to 
resources. It was a highly contentious, emotionally charged, risky project that, in 
retrospect, was a personal cause celebre reflecting a tendency to charge windmills (and 
persuade others to join in), oblivious of unintended consequences.12 However, it led to 
significant policy and financial commitment from the Council, procedural changes, 
improved inter-agency work and increased confidence demonstrated through a massive 
increase in reporting. It established new norms and rules and established boundaries to 
behaviours. It also reinvigorated community development approaches to race equality 
within the Council, focusing on the white community (CCC, 1994).  
The Citizen’s Jury process began with 700 street and school-based interviews with young 
people, followed by a ‘Grand Jury’ of 40, deliberating the findings and choosing ‘things to 
do’ as the key issue to explore further. Fourteen young people were trained in interviewing, 
confidence-building and presentation skills before four half-day sessions questioning 
senior Council officers and other agencies. The process was a deliberate attempt to expose 
                                                            
12 Not least a backlash within communities or raising expectations. One consequence was racist hate mail 
from across the UK to the Council officers involved, which, I felt at the time, meant we were doing 
something right. 
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powerful agents to excluded voices on young people’s terms.13 It was also to disrupt adult 
perceptions and legitimate claims for enhanced resources. The Council auctioned most of 
the 32 recommendations, including resourcing youth work and an extensive participation 
scheme still running in 2012. Widely praised for its innovation, it won a Guardian/Institute 
for Public Policy Research Public Involvement Award in 2000. The real success in 
entrepreneurial terms was a city council investing in what was normally a county council 
duty, adopting engagement techniques relevant to young people and activities they actually 
wanted.14  
My ‘public entrepreneur’ skills where particularly put to test when appointed Head of 
Community Development at Canterbury City Council in 2000 to establish a new service. 
While there was political will from the ruling Liberal Democrats, there was resistance from 
the Conservatives and some senior officers, as well as limited resources. The fear was that, 
in creating new services, existing services would lose out financially unless external 
resources could be secured. Some saw potential disruption to normal practices, roles and 
responsibilities, others saw no need to move from servicing to enabling communities. The 
community development function was perceived as helping other officers undertake direct 
work rather than specialists, to administer grants and manage ‘community’ services such as 
senior citizens’ bus passes, CCTV and community safety. I had the impression that 
community development was perceived as a political fad that most hoped would go away 
as soon as possible, and that there was limited appetite for targeted social interventions 
apart from the ‘normal business’ such as housing, tenant participation and consultation 
exercises for audit purposes. 
To resource the fulfilment of local needs, community development had to make a 
contribution to ‘the enhancement of existing institutions’ (Marti and Mair, 2009: 101) and 
organization, as well as creating new institutions. Of course, organizations expect and seek 
to manage internal entrepreneurship. Local authorities are adept at managing political and 
officer entrepreneurship through bureaucratic processes. Existing resources had to be bent 
to provide the springboard: evidence of need, new voices to engage with the democratic 
process and high profile ‘taster’ interventions to provide ‘proof of concept’. Providing 
powerful actors with what they wanted (press coverage, happy voters and plaudits from 
external legitimizing agencies) could smooth the way for further investment. I tried to 
continue what Mintzberg describes as ‘engaged management that cares, not a heroic 
                                                            
13 My favourite moment was when a rather pompous director was cross-questioned in detail by a 13-year old 
girl. The more he evaded, the more she pushed, with Jeremy Paxman-like skill. 
14 See Dean (2000), for an account of the process; http: //www.guardian.co.uk/society/2000/ 
nov/01/bestvalue.guardiansocietysupplement 
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leadership that cures’ (Kleiner, 2010). Although much of the organizational work to 
‘establish confidence’ relied on expert knowledge and experience, to ‘disavow perfection’ 
(Weick, 2001: 120) and work with and through others was of equal importance as being 
perceived as an innovator or the leader. I felt I had good intuition, born of experience, and 
could ‘recognise key patterns that indicate the patterns of the situation’ (Klein, 1999: 31). 
However, as Weick suggests, inviting doubt, reassembling and shaping experience to ‘fit 
novelties in the present’ (2001: 113) promotes learning and militates against over-
confidence or dogmatic approaches. Balancing immediate impact, resisting the temptation 
to impose solutions and enhancing my reputation with consensus and co-production was 
often a struggle. In fact, I used directive and non-directive approaches simultaneously, 
establishing control and order, and exemplifying normative behaviours of a council 
officer15 alongside bending rules and creating innovative spaces. 
Through bending existing budgets, improving delivery of services, building on springboard 
activity and attracting external funding, within three years the portfolio grew extensively, 
employed over fifty staff (see CV, Appendix iii) and met identified local needs. High 
profile projects such as the ‘511’ children’s team and ‘Streetrunner’ (detached youth work) 
provided a breakthrough and consolidated preparatory organizational persuasion, 
development and the embedding of community development institutions. I gave particular 
attention to creating a brand (while reinforcing the council brand) and ensuring services 
added value to corporate objectives. Alongside Cambridge, Canterbury’s remains one of 
the few significant local authority community development services left in the UK.  
The creation of the Public Safety Service typifies my approach and the integration of 
institutional logics. Initially resisting involvement in community safety work at Cambridge 
because of its enforcement ethos, I created a well-resourced the service and targeted the 
same communities. Punitive policy had populist appeal, unlike preventative initiatives. 
However, the community safety agenda offered scope for a public entrepreneur. At 
Cambridge, preventative projects were ‘bolt on’; at Canterbury, they became integral. My 
first step was to improve existing services and build confidence, the second was to secure 
external resources, and the third to disrupt imposed interventions and demonstrate new 
ways of working. For instance, individualized punitive measures, the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) were prioritized by Government and local Community Safety 
Partnership. By integrating and co-locating Police and Council staff within the service and 
                                                            
15 This is apart from my failure to wear the quasi-official senior officer dress code of suit and tie beyond my 
first week. The Chief Executive suggested strongly that the politicians would not take me seriously if I did 
not, but I argued that communities would not take me seriously if I did; the compromise was a tie at official 
events, T shirts at all other times!  
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developing a methodology that combined legal, environmental and social interventions to 
community safety issues and incidents, a more nuanced approach evolved. For instance, 
rather than using ASBOs to tackle the nuisance of youths drinking in public spaces, a 
strategy that combined youth work reconnaissance to scope the issues; targeted 
interventions if required against ringleaders; displacement activities (youth projects); 
trading standards action against retailers; and improvements to natural surveillance to 
reassure adults (cut down bushes). The service became a Local Government Association 
‘Pathfinder’ and I presented the approach to Ministers (Stott and Arias, 2002). Resisting 
the coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) of the state (sanctioned success 
was measured in the number of ASBOs achieved) actually provided better solutions16 as 
well as cross-subsidizing youth work. By reinforcing the council’s community safety 
credentials and gaining external legitimacy, it created space for innovation and 
subsequently investment. Persuading a district council to undertake county responsibilities 
such as youth work is, in my opinion, no mean achievement.  
My time at Canterbury was intensive, exhilarating and I believed the apex of a career in 
community development. I felt that my approach was valued (a team player, but critical 
friend) and demonstrable success brought enhanced confidence and space for innovation. I 
contributed to national forums and debates and had a degree of influence not normally 
associated with a ‘third tier’ council officer. The next step was managing non-related 
services as a Director. However, having commuted weekly for three years from Cambridge 
it was time for a move.  
Reflecting on my experiences before joining Keystone, Marti and Mair’s description of 
strategies utilized by the ‘often powerless, disenfranchised and under-resourced’ (2009: 
101) resonates. While I had significant power, the strategies reflected the institutional and 
organizational work I had undertaken acting with or for disadvantaged communities: 
experimentation; ‘probing for weaknesses and exploiting small advantages’; enhancing 
existing institutions; challenging myths and ‘structures of dominance’; building 
‘provisional institutions; ‘navigating across different institutional logics’ (2009: 101). For 
Marti and Mair, institutional change has consequences often unintended and not 
necessarily beneficial. From university I had a deep suspicion of state or large social 
engineering programmes that began in good faith but resulted in numerous unintended 
consequences, usually with a disproportional impact on already disadvantaged groups or 
places. Following Marti and Mair, favouring ‘small steps and reversibility’ (2009: 103) to 
                                                            
16 ASBOs were relatively easy to apply, but difficult to monitor and enforce. They absorbed incredible 
amounts of Police and council staff time, yet rarely altered behaviours, in my experience. 
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minimize negative consequences was central to my approach to community work. A skill 
was to understand ‘how and under what conditions agency was possible’ (ibid); not 
necessarily to confront head on (which could lead to a war of attrition that the powerless 
frequently lose), but simultaneously enhance and disrupt institutions and organizations. 
Within a local authority, as a community-oriented ‘public entrepreneur’ it indeed meant 
policing and pirating; the integration of seemingly conflicting institutional logics. As 
Besharov and Smith suggest, such integration can assist in creating novel interpretations, 
innovation and survival (n.d: 2); the ability to combine logics certainly assisted in my next 
challenge. 
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3. Public Works 
 
1. Overview  
The public work submitted for the award of a Doctorate of Professional Studies is 
Keystone Development Trust as an organization and portfolio of socio-economic 
interventions. Keystone is presented as the overarching public work, with a range of public 
works that support the submission presented in evidence. To build an organization that 
simultaneously delivers social impact and financial sustainability required continual 
organizational and institutional work at the individual, organization, community and 
societal levels. This is demonstrated through a retrospective framework that combines a 
critique of the institutions framing the development trust and social enterprise models; an 
overview and critical reflection on the journey and an overview and critical reflection on 
the supporting evidence. 
The retrospective framework charts the key phases as the Trust evolved. The first section 
focuses on the framing and forming of the Trust in 2003: in particular, the conceptual 
foundations. The second concentrates on the entrepreneurial foundations 2004-2007, 
including the implementation of the conceptual framework and a critical engagement with 
social enterprise discourses as services developed. The third continues to develop the 
above themes as the Trust approached sustainability in the aftermath of the cessation of 
public funding in 2007-10. It reflects on how learning was shared and built upon to 
challenge institutions and develop new approaches to the issues facing the Trust and its 
beneficiaries. The fourth focuses on adaption and innovation within austerity 2011-12, 
including new alliances, areas of business and challenges to social policy. It concludes 
with critical reflections on the current challenges facing entrepreneurial third sector 
organizations.  
The evidence presented includes Trust documents, publications (sole and co-authored), 
short films and consultancy reports (see Appendix i, a-c). Within the evidence, Trust 
socio-economic interventions are detailed; within the text, a number of key projects are 
discussed to demonstrate how institutional and organizational work was combined in 
furtherance of mission. When mentioned in the text, the evidence is highlighted by italics. 
Supporting evidence is also included such as press cuttings, external reports featuring 
Keystone and Trust newsletters (see Appendix ii). 
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While much of the evidence is accessible online, for assessment purposes I have included 
accompanying discs. The evidence contains co-produced and co-authored works. I had a 
leadership role in all the works, which included framing, project managing, authoring and 
editing. To demonstrate dissemination of learning and impact, with the clients’ permission 
a selection of confidential consultancy reports is made available for the purposes of this 
context statement. 
Creation of the public works 
The context in which the public work was created is extremely challenging. The Trust 
serves an area that experiences entrenched deprivation and pressing social needs. The area 
faces significant growth and combines urban and rural issues. It is increasingly diverse as 
mobile European workers live, work and settle. Local resources to meet social needs are 
limited. Public grants for community organizations (local, regional and national) are 
shrinking and intensely competitive, as is access to grants from philanthropic trusts. The 
Trust did have significant public resources 2003-07, but the challenge was to invest in 
entrepreneurial projects that could sustain future activity. Many stakeholders did not 
initially support the entrepreneurial approach or consider it viable. I felt that the 
development trust model of fusing community and market logics was riven with tensions, 
and particularly problematic when working in a poor area. 
Given the challenging context of the work, not least having to sustain an organization 
committed to the poorest people and places through trading, necessities for survival are 
continual reflexivity, sense making, adaption and innovation because social action (or lack 
of it) has real consequences for people and places. In retrospect, the public works were co-
created through a recursive process of observation, orientation, decision making and 
action; Boyd’s17 OODA loop18 provides ‘a model of individual and organizational learning 
and adaption’ (Osinga, 2007: 235). The key elements of the OODA loop are:  
 Observing focuses on sensing the external environment  
 Orientating is synthesizing information recognizing the importance of: previous 
learning; institutions; context and organizational history (own and others) 
 Deciding represents a plan of action  
 Acting is the execution of the plan 
                                                            
17 Boyd’s strategic theory has heavily influenced contemporary military thinking and organizations, but not 
mainstream organizational theory as yet, partly because his thoughts were disseminated primarily through 
presentations and briefings. 
18 http: //lesleym100.wordpress.com/2009/12/11/eight-social-media-commandments-and-the-ooda-loop/ooda/ 
Accessed 5/4/12. 
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Figure 3.1: Boyd’s OODA loop 
Boyd emphasized the development, maintenance and reshaping of individual and 
organizational orientation to adapt to change, complexity and surprise (ibid: 237). 
Adaption includes the repair and remodelling of concepts, ideas and observations ‘to 
provide coherent, robust, and actionable insight into an organizational dilemma’ 
(Boxenbaum and Rouleau, 2011: 281) involving a degree of improvisation and bricolage. 
Existing knowledge is reinterpreted and transformed in ‘response to contextual factors’; 
‘the situation in a given place at a particular moment in time’ (ibid).  
For individual and organizations to thrive in uncertainty requires agility and leadership that 
builds trust, and encourages cooperation and space for creativity and innovation (Osinga, 
2007: 239). Following Tracey et al., my contribution has focused on problem framing, 
counterfactual thinking, building and theorizing the ‘organizational template’ connecting 
with a ‘macrodiscourse, and aligning with highly legitimate actors’ (2011: 75). It has also 
concentrated on developing a leadership style that facilitates learning, adaption and 
innovation. My Keystone journey has been an attempt to blend prior and contextual 
experiences with academic study to provide actionable insights in response to the 
paradoxes inherent in combining social and commercial logics of the organizational form. 
The evidence demonstrates a sustained contribution to social innovation and local impact 
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as well as a wider impact through; an engagement with national debates; sharing learning 
through consultancy; shaping institutions and organizations. 
Organizational context: the development trust model 
Development trusts are independent, ‘not for private profit’ organizations located in a 
defined community. Development trusts aim to achieve social and economic regeneration 
through creating wealth and opportunity and keep social and financial returns within the 
community. They are community-owned and managed. Most trusts operate within the most 
deprived communities in the United Kingdom, although in the last few years the model is 
being applied to a wide range of communities (Stott et al., 2004). Currently there are 
around 500 trusts in the UK. 
Development trusts are a micro response to macro social and economic change. They aim 
to achieve a degree of community economic stability and a ‘buffer’ between the local and 
the global through community control and ownership of capital (Imbroscio et al., 2003). 
They also aim to achieve a degree of social resilience as the state retreats, and social 
innovation in reaction to perceived failures of the state and market. I would also argue that 
development trusts attempt to foster new forms of social solidarity that reflect diversity, 
but finds common cause, interests and mutual aid.  
Development trusts can take many legal forms, for instance: charity, company or 
Community Interest Company. They tend to be classified as part of the voluntary and 
community sector or third sector. However, as entrepreneurial organizations engaged in 
trading activity, such classifications are not always clear-cut. Recently trusts, along with 
social and community enterprises, have been described as hybrid organizations as in 
institutional terms, as they attempt to fuse commercial and community logics. 
To confuse matters further, development trusts may also be described as social or 
community enterprises (the differences between community and social enterprise are 
discussed later in this chapter). What is distinctive about the development trust model is 
that they are rooted in particular communities of place in which they develop a long-term 
relationship. Place, in this context, reflects people’s sense of belonging and emotional 
commitment, whether a street, neighbourhood or town (Cresswell, 2004). Development 
Trusts tend to have an organizational mission which attempts to tackle social and economic 
issues holistically. For instance, they may be engaged simultaneously in social, housing 
and economic development activity.  
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2. Framing and forming (2003) 
Today, Keystone is perceived as an exemplar of the development trust model, with a 
portfolio combining community development, social enterprise and property. The Trust 
owns £5.6 million of assets and a turnover of around £800,000; it earns around 75% of its 
income through trading activities (rent, sales, and contracts). Through achieving asset-
based post-public funding sustainability, balancing institutional logics, a focus on 
unpopular people (such as European migrants and the ‘workless’) and fulfilling funder’s 
expectations, the Trust has had an impact and influence disproportionate to its size.  
In March 2003 it was in transition from a quango hosted by a district council to a 
charitable company. Keystone Partnership was largely a ‘front’; resources flowed in from 
national funds to deliver social, environmental and physical projects through external 
public and third sector organizations. There was little clarity on how the development trust 
model could be operationalized or sustainability achieved by 2007. From attending 
meetings before joining I concluded the model had been adopted for three reasons; 
funders’ isomorphic pressures for an ‘exit strategy’;19 the unwillingness of local authorities 
to commit to post-2007 resources and a somewhat blind faith in new national funds 
materializing or that a community organization could access sufficient philanthropic 
grants.  
Keystone Partnership was riven with learning, belonging, organizational and performance 
paradoxes (Smith and Lewis, 2011: 384). Apart from a few Board members, I perceived 
few with an appetite for shifting from a conduit for resources to a delivery organization, let 
alone an entrepreneurial organization. The Board was conflicted; external interests often 
trumped Keystone’s and there were tensions around how to achieve organizational 
outcomes. The plurality of stakeholders created tensions around goals and priorities. An 
option was to focus on the delivery of the regeneration programme rather than create an 
entrepreneurial organization and move on before the watershed of 2007; a personal 
strategy with which I was not comfortable.  
Within the first month at Keystone I presented three papers to the Board: Developing 
Keystone20 (KDT, 2003a); Land and building acquisition (KDT, 2003b) and Keystone’s 
‘Endowment Plan’ (KDT, 2003d); these lay the foundations for all subsequent work. Prior 
                                                            
19 In regeneration projects, exit strategies are curious beasts. ‘Spend and deliver then do nothing’ is not an 
option, on paper at least. The options are usually ‘mainstream activity into local authority budgets; create 
independent income streams; a combination of both’, given that delivery pressures exit strategies are often 
written, shelved and worried about too close to the end of funding to be implemented.  
20 A preliminary draft was presented by myself to the Board in February as Chief Executive Designate (KDT, 
2003c). 
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to joining I had drawn up my initial strategy in an interview presentation (Stott, 2002) and 
drafted Developing Keystone, on recruitment. In the first month I met key external 
stakeholders, Board members and staff to familiarize myself with the local context, 
critiques of the organization and aspirations. I also researched the experiences of other 
development trusts to understand how others had approached the fusion of community and 
commercial logics. I felt that the Trust was at a critical point in its development. The 
decisions made as it moved to independence would frame all future developments, in 
particular how it used the public ‘endowment’ to create sustainability when the funding 
ceased. There was pressure to make rapid decisions from funding bodies and stakeholders, 
so time was not on my side. The papers were a product of previous experience, intuition, 
studying the literature and a rapid assessment of the context.  
Developing Keystone critiqued organizational performance to date and crystallized my 
initial insights into how a new Trust could deliver a substantial regeneration programme 
and the first steps towards sustainability; built on investments in assets which generated 
sustained income. From my experience at Canterbury I recognized the importance of 
building relationships, trust and legitimacy through branded delivery; also a coherent 
vision and implementation strategy; Developing Keystone provided a vision, aims and 
organizational design. The paper also captured insights that had major implications; the 
importance of holistic interventions; mixed income streams and the need to differentiate 
between enterprises aimed at maximizing profit and social outcomes within the portfolio.21 
The holistic approach emerged in reaction to the influence of Putnam’s (2001) 
conceptualization of social capital on public policy which neglected economic, cultural 
(Bourdieu, 1986) and human capital. In my experience, enhancing social capital alone is 
insufficient to make real changes in poorer places; Keystone needed to build on the vision 
of the SRB 6 programme for multiple socio-economic interventions and implement 
Smallbone et al.’s suggestion that trusts have a ‘holistic approach implicit in their 
development model’ (2001: 21). I proposed a ‘community capital’ model22to build social, 
personal, financial, environmental, cultural and physical capital simultaneously, later 
summarized as:  
To build community capital – the collective skills, knowledge, experience, 
facilities and organizations which ensure greater returns in the quality of life for all, 
and to anchor community capital locally to ensure sustainable returns. (KDT 
2004b) 
                                                            
21 It built on preliminary thoughts outlined in my interview presentation (Stott, 2002). 
22 First presented during the interview process (see the presentation ‘Leading the Trust, making a difference’ 
Stott, 2002). 
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Enshrined in organizational aims, the model allowed a wide range of interventions but, as 
‘opportunities for social entrepreneurs often far outstrip the resources available to address 
them’ (Austin et al., 2003: 19), it also gave rise to a major strategic problem in choosing 
‘what not to do’ (Porter, 1998: 85). My overriding goal at the time was to demonstrate that 
the Trust could be ‘distinctive, relevant and effective’ (KDT, 2003a: 3). 
Although the social enterprise literature privileged self-sufficiency through trading (Stott, 
2005) and ‘grant dependency’ in the third sector was becoming akin to’ benefit dependency’ 
in policy discourses (Macmillan, 2007), I was not convinced that an ‘either/or’ strategy was 
sensible. I considered grants as a form of redistribution; a means to fund activities 
unsustainable by any other means or unpopular with the giving public. Trading was fine if 
you had something to sell and people willing to buy; Keystone did not. It felt premature to 
shut down any income opportunity. Two approaches dominated the social enterprise 
literature at the time; the social business and community models. The former emphasized 
wealth creation and market engagement (Dees et al., 2001; DTI, 2002); the latter 
concentrated on place and social outcomes within ‘community businesses’ (Pearce, 1993, 
2003). While the social business model was in the ascendancy, following Pearce (1998) I 
suggested that Keystone needed to do both; develop commercial activities primarily to 
maximize profit to underpin the Trust and ‘protected’ social enterprises that met social or 
environmental outcomes but required subsidy due to the additional cost (KDT: 2003a: 3). 
Although controversial, I emphasized the need for commercial projects that focused on 
profit, not necessarily social aims and engaged with the market on its own terms. 
An immense amount of organizational work followed the March 2003 Board; 
restructuring, re-branding, bending resources to fit objectives; releasing monies to enable 
direct delivery, as well as shaping policy and procedures. The pace of organizational 
development was intense; legitimacy (over and above the ‘honeymoon’ afforded to a new 
Chief Executive) relied on demonstrable successes. Developing Keystone – six month 
review (KDT, 2003e) charts the rapid organizational change, but highlights the frustration 
over time spent ‘tidying up’.  
Challenging conceptual frameworks 
Kirchner argues that the three leadership spheres of a Third Sector Chief Executive are: 
leading upwards (managing governance); leading downwards (managing resources); 
leading outwards (managing relationships) (2007: 52). While pertinent, the challenge I 
faced was to lead a relatively new form of third sector organization riven with tensions. 
Publically embracing the development trust model, I worried about how to operationalize a 
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model I considered flawed; the combination of market and community logics within 
organizations tied to poor places. The challenge was to provide leadership while 
understanding how to ameliorate or resolve the tensions created by combining logics. 
Furthermore, I was surprised at the resistance to the model, developing commercial 
activities in particular, from a significant part of the Board and external stakeholders who 
had, in theory, endorsed the model. The key areas of dispute were direct delivery, 
prioritization of poorer people and places, commercially driven property and trading 
outside the charitable area. Alongside the organizational work, understanding the 
implications of combined institutional logics and undertaking institutional work to inform 
and shape individual and organizational codes, norms, behaviours and expectations seemed 
paramount: in other words, creating new organizational discourses, influencing key 
stakeholders and shaping external relationships. 
In July 2003 I began a two-year Masters in Community Enterprise at the Judge Business 
School; although perhaps rash having started a new job the experience was invaluable. 
While ‘learning on the hoof’, combining the immediate demands of work with space to 
problematize the issues through an engagement with management literature and discussion 
with faculty and experienced practitioners proved crucial to my development. Firstly I used 
the course to heuristically test ideas, intuition and assumptions around creating a 
sustainability strategy for a development trust as well as a research focus on strategic 
tensions. Secondly I translated learning and actionable insights to leading actors and 
thirdly, operationalized insights.  
Alarmed by the neglect of the ‘awkward realities’ (Patton, 2004: 37) inherent in 
development trusts within the wider movement, I built on Ketchen et al.’s seminal paper 
(1996) and Tracey (2004) to clarify the strategic tensions (Stott, 2005; Stott and Tracey, 
2007) summarized below: 
Process Governance – community/participatory v business models 
Multiple stakeholders and accountabilities 
Community/entrepreneurial cultural differences 
Capacity – expertise (Board and staff), access to finance for capacity building 
Content Goal compatibility – community/market building  
Emphasis – social capacity or profit maximization 
Position – private, public or third sector orientation? 
Context Policy  
Position – engaging with 3 worlds; public, private, third sector. Lack of understanding of model 
Socio-economic 
Table 3.1: Strategic tensions 
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These tensions captured the dilemmas facing Keystone in framing a strategic direction. A 
key insight drawn from the history of US Community Development Corporations 
(Halpern, 1995), confirmed later by research and experience, was the proposition that the 
dual goals enshrined in organizational purpose create an inherent tension which is 
compounded by place related tensions; in particular being rooted in poor places. This 
‘dominant tension’ infuses all aspects of strategy and presents a paradox trusts and their 
predecessors struggled to cope with (Stott, 2005). 
By late autumn 2003 the proposals in Developing Keystone, the early experiences leading 
the Trust and the academic work crystallized into a conceptual framework which shaped 
the direction of the Trust. Given delivery and spend timescales, decisions had to be taken 
rapidly; I was reassured that intuition built on prior experience resonated with the more 
critically orientated social enterprise literature. In summary; 
 The dual goals appeared valid and incompatible but had to be attended to 
simultaneously; therefore the Trust had to deliver a holistic programme spanning 
community development, social enterprise and property development to fulfil social-
economic mission and achieve sustainability. 
 Governance had to balance business and community approaches to achieve 
sustainability while maintaining legitimacy. 
 Direct delivery was essential to build trust, relationships, presence, brand and track 
record. 
 The public investment should be treated as an ‘endowment’ to generate further income; 
deliver agreed programmes but ensure as much as possible contributed to achieving 
sustainability. 
 A mixed income stream of grant, rent and commercial services was a pragmatic 
strategy; in time trading activity may provide a surplus for reinvestment into 
community services. 
 Poor places present a major challenge in generating surplus; therefore to serve cash 
poor communities, cash rich communities needed to be targeted to generate income. 
 Achieving a profit while either serving poorer customers or providing opportunity for 
disadvantaged clients and/or an environmental good was a tall order; to be sustainable, 
the Trust needed ‘strictly commercial’ enterprises. 
Without robust relationships, trust and a deep understanding of the local community, 
organizational legitimacy and the ability to develop appropriate interventions would be 
compromised. Without the development of mixed income streams the long term future of 
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the Trust would be compromised. Therefore the Trust’s core business was conceptualized 
as a cyclical process summarized below (KDT, 2004c): 
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Figure 3.2: Core business model 
Product, process and profit: a typology and model 
It felt important at the time to differentiate between the roles of social enterprises that the 
Trust intended to create as ‘process, product and profit’. Stakeholder expectations were 
high. The isomorphic pressures on social enterprises and entrepreneurial charities focused 
on achieving a ‘triple bottom line’ of social, environmental and financial impact (McKay et 
al., 2011). ‘Heroic’ practitioner accounts that emphasized the potential rather than 
problems in achieving a triple bottom line have percolated into Government policy on 
social enterprise (c.f DTI, 2002). I worried about how it was possible simultaneously to be 
nice to people, save the planet and make a profit! As Pharoah et al. argue:  
To suggest that there are tensions between the social and economic is to go 
against the grain of much social enterprise literature, in which social return 
and economic return are sometimes portrayed as a sort of ‘peaches and 
cream’ combination. (2004. 29) 
The evidence that social enterprises or development trusts without an endowment of land 
in areas of growing affluence (such as Coin Street Community Builders) could deliver 
significant social, environmental and economic impact without on-going public subsidy 
was limited. Historically, social enterprises and their predecessors, where closely tied to 
local or national state policy and funding (Amin et al., 2002). Moreover, many relied on 
public grant or contracts to achieve sustainability. The social/community typology I 
developed included; 
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 Product-oriented enterprises that focus on delivering essential service or meet a social/ 
environmental need 
 Process-oriented enterprises that prioritize social objectives such as training, assisting 
target groups back into work 
 Profit-oriented enterprises that prioritize surplus generation. 
The rationale for the typology was that by emphasizing social outcomes, product and 
process enterprises would probably incur significant costs that would be difficult to recoup, 
such as extra support required for staff or sub-optimal production processes, because of the 
nature of the staff or trainees. Product and process social enterprise would operate in a 
limited local market with poorer clients or consumers. Small-scale, they might not achieve 
the efficiencies, capital investment or economies of scale of potential competitors. 
Sustainability rests on the offer to public clients and attracting subsidy through grants or a 
‘social premium’ through branding. Fairtrade products, for example, may be more 
expensive than their competitors, but customers recognize that the extra cost contributes to 
the development of the producers and their communities. Profit-oriented social enterprises’ 
prime purpose would be to deliver surplus to reinvest into core costs and cross-subsidize 
the above or community projects.  
The typology aimed conceptually to fuse the social business and community models 
prevalent in the literature within the Trust; achieving sustainability through a mixed 
income stream but striving towards self-sufficiency through an engagement with the 
market on its own terms. Each type of enterprise had a particular rationale, context, 
financial and governance challenges and understanding their orientation was crucial in 
making choices, developing appropriate business plans and balancing overall social and 
economic impact. My ‘dominant orientation model’ (KDT, 2004c) placed each in relation 
to; market/capacity building priorities; business/ community processes; and importance of 
place.  
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Figure 3.3: Dominant orientation model 
The model clarified my thinking and provided a tool to communicate the Trust’s intentions 
to simultaneously deliver community projects; locally-oriented social enterprise to create 
opportunities or provide goods and services for vulnerable/excluded people; and profit-
generating enterprises. I envisaged each cluster to be delivered within separate legal 
entities (charitable company and a number of trading subsidiaries) to overcome strategic 
tensions inherent in the model through providing clarity of purpose; minimizing financial 
risk to the charity; ‘fit to form’ governance (inclusive charity board and lean business-
oriented boards) and minimizing cultural differences between community and business-
focused staff. 
 While subsidiaries were established, to date none have been activated, primarily because 
of the tax benefits of trading as a charity, costs of multiple governance and the Trustees’ 
increasing sophistication in balancing tensions utilizing the model. In 2003/04 the model 
provided a framework for decision making on potential enterprises, organizational 
structure and persuading external stakeholders. 
Applying the model: the property portfolio 
I was convinced that how the Trust invested in property would define its future. The model 
was immediately applied to developing a portfolio in which each property had a defined 
function; community, local socio-economic development or surplus generation. Moreover, 
the Trust needed a significant and commercial asset to generate long-term income. There 
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has been a growing trend, linked to the burgeoning asset transfer movement,23 of expecting 
property to deliver the ‘triple bottom line’ even in poor places. With declining public 
grants, community centres, leisure facilities and other public buildings are expected to 
develop trading activities in order to survive. While this is possible in certain contexts (for 
instance, village halls or arts centres in predominantly affluent areas), I believed it to be 
untenable in poorer areas and distracting from the core mission. If Keystone’s mission was 
to provide community facilities but could not balance the books through renting space to 
local groups, it would cross-subsidize from commercial activities. Given twenty years of 
managing community centres, I also felt that attracting commercial tenants or customers 
into community facilities was problematic due to culture clashes, perceptions of particular 
areas and operational practicalities. Regeneration schemes involving third sector 
organizations in poorer places often provided ‘managed workspaces’ to stimulate local 
entrepreneurial activity predominantly with low rents for start-ups and small businesses; it 
was rarer to provide high quality space to attract external businesses. 
A few weeks before I joined Keystone, the plan to purchase a single factory and office 
block to accommodate regeneration projects fell apart.24 I quickly realized that it was not a 
disaster, but an opportunity to rethink the asset strategy. The Board had envisaged 
community and economic development (mainly delivered by others) operating cheek by 
jowl. I was not convinced, particularly as the factory would not have been conducive to 
commercial lets even after major refurbishment. In Keystone’s ‘Endowment Plan’ (KDT, 
2003d), Land and building acquisition (KDT, 2003b) recommended buying land for 
business units, an existing centre for voluntary organizations and a listed building as the 
Trust’s headquarters. The first step was to ensure that each property was fit for a particular 
purpose. Negotiations began with a local council on the transfer of a key community centre 
as well as a windfall opportunity for extra European grant to purchase a large factory as a 
start-up/social enterprise centre. 
The critical decisions the Trust took in 2003 were around what was to become the 
Keystone Innovation Centre. Land was purchased to build a new business centre. External 
stakeholders envisaged a quick build, ‘portacabin’ style offices to house start-ups and 
small businesses managed by an external property specialist. I argued for prestige offices 
within an iconic building to attract maximum rental values and managed by Keystone. 
Once the concept was agreed for a £3.2 million investment, considerable pressure was 
exerted to include a nursery and other community spaces. I was adamant that mixed use 
                                                            
23 See http: //atu.org.uk/ 
24 The vendor doubled the price to £2m at the last moment. 
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would undermine the primary rationale of attracting top-end tenants to provide significant 
income streams. Mainstream opinion was that such a facility was not appropriate for the 
local context and unsustainable; this was supported by a report commissioned from 
external consultants which stressed the lack of demand. I felt Thetford had sufficient 
affordable property for local needs, but little to attract new white collar jobs. I advocated a 
‘build it and they will come’ strategy; public investment to drive demand. Given the risks 
of a ‘white elephant’ and mildly shaken by the opposition (at one point the Leader of a 
Council asked my Chair to fire me, which she declined to do), I amended the concept to 
include a cafe and conferencing suite to diversify income, rather than purely office 
accommodation. 
Having convinced the Board and regional fund managers to support the innovation centre 
concept, Keystone took direct control of the design, procurement and build process. In the 
face of continued local stakeholder opposition it took a degree of ‘pig-headed’ resilience 
by key Trustees and me to implement the concept; as well as the wider conceptual 
framework.  
Promoting the conceptual framework 
Kraatz argues that institutional work done by organizational leaders consists of ‘legitimacy 
seeking behaviours’ and the ‘creation and maintenance of organizational integrity’ (2009: 
73). Pluralistic organizations need to be ‘multiple things to multiple people’, win support 
and ‘demonstrate cultural fitness to the different elements of its institutional environment’ 
(op cit: 72). Creating integrity requires efforts to ‘knit together diverse constituencies’ and 
‘to engender cooperation and win consent’ (op cit: 73). As Developing Keystone – six 
month review (KDT, 2003e) illustrates, the embryonic Trust was in the middle of a ‘perfect 
storm’ of competing stakeholder priorities, change and challenges to legitimacy. It was still 
my overriding impression that many local stakeholders wanted the Trust to spend the 
public money and then quietly fade away. Two basic problems remained. Firstly, the 
model of an entrepreneurial third sector organization that aimed to deliver community 
interventions and trade was not well understood; it challenged common perceptions of 
public/private/charity or voluntary sectors. Secondly, the Trust had yet to deliver anything 
over and above existing SRB projects and many of those were delayed. 
Income generation and development and trusts (KDT, 2004f) and Trust sustainability 
(KDT, 2004d) papers discussed the key issues and proposed framework. The Trust 
Strategic Development Plan 2004-2008 (KDT, 2004b), drafted and consulted on in 2003, 
articulated the vision, framework and delivery intentions. Designed for a mixed audience, 
33 
it actually appealed to regional or national more than local stakeholders. While cohesive, 
reflecting a holistic approach and underpinned by a framework that attempted to balance 
organizational tensions, it was perceived locally by some as too ‘academic’, aspirational 
and unachievable.25 While I was wrapped up in problematizing the development trust 
model and engaged in institutional work with funder stakeholders, Board and staff to 
legitimize my approach, I was acutely aware that local external legitimacy was equally 
important. I gave numerous talks to local organizations, which remained unmoved. The 
fusion of community and commercial logics was perceived as a rather dubious ambition 
for a charity or unachievable in the local context. Selling ideas and intentions was an uphill 
task without demonstrable evidence; it did not help using examples from elsewhere, since 
‘it is different here’ was the refrain. Through the prism of existing local institutional 
frameworks, the alternative proto-institutions of an entrepreneurial third sector 
organization lacked legitimacy or traction.  
I realized achieving institutional legitimacy or traction locally was not immediately 
achievable; it required patience and persistence. I began to emphasize that Keystone was a 
community regeneration charity, to ground it in a recognizable form. I also downplayed 
the social enterprise and sustainability elements until we had projects underway; this 
decoupled internal action from external presentation. Drawing on previous experience and 
bending available resources, I drove the implementation of community projects to meet 
identified needs through direct delivery; this built legitimacy through engagement with less 
vocal or politicized groups. Delivering quasi-leisure projects for children and young people 
or large-scale public events built legitimacy and ‘showcased’ what could be achieved and 
were understandable, popular and photogenic. Targeted well, they provided a 
‘springboard’ within key communities and a ‘stalking horse’ for investment into the less 
popular groups such as ‘anti-social’ youths. I considered that reaching the people and 
places others couldn’t or wouldn’t to be central to the Trust’s mission. 
Early work with European migrants 
Amongst the most unpopular groups in the area was the growing Portuguese and Polish 
community. The Portuguese, in particular, caught unwelcome local attention; migrants 
with Brazilian or Angolan roots were noticeably ‘different’. Norfolk had not been known 
for its ethnic mix. As Derbyshire (1994) pointed out, isolated migrants in rural areas could 
suffer acute racism without the supportive networks developed in urban areas. Attracted to 
East Anglia by employers and recruitment agencies to fill ‘picking, plucking and packing’ 
jobs, London overspill towns like Thetford provided cheap private sector accommodation 
                                                            
25 Some feedback was less polite. 
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(ex-social housing on large estates). Not only was racial harassment on the rise, migrants 
experienced exploitation by some gang masters and by some employers and landlords. 
Local sensitivities were growing around pressure on public services and jobs being taken, 
fuelled by media attention (Wiles et al., 2007). Legitimate European migration for work 
was confused in the popular consciousness with illegal immigration. 
Much of the everyday tensions revolved around community interactions in shops, schools, 
GPs and homes. While the language was a barrier, much of the tension focused on cultural 
differences or migrants not being aware of everyday practices; not putting bins out on the 
right day, or overflowing bins, became a lightning rod for community wrath. Estates which 
already experienced significant deprivation population rose rapidly as migrants sought 
cheaper homes to rent. Homes of Multiple Occupation (HMOs) blossomed as migrants 
attempted to reduce expenditure through sharing homes, adding further to tensions. 
Having led a change programme around racial harassment and race equality projects at 
Cambridge and Canterbury, and with no noticeable actions by public agencies, I felt 
Keystone should intervene by; 
 Helping migrants help themselves through stimulating mutual support 
 Celebrate diversity through events/community arts 
 Provide space for positive interaction between host and migrant communities 
 Provide information to help migrants settle in and ameliorate everyday tensions 
 Provide language teaching 
 Research and dissemination. 
Leveraging existing resources, a substantial Home Office grant was secured and an 
Equalities Team established by late 2003. I did not realize at the time how much work with 
migrants would shape the Trust, build our national reputation or impact on local 
relationships. 
2003: A defining year 
Telling the organizational story before embarking on the professional doctorate, I 
emphasized how important 2003 was in defining the future work of the Trust. A re-reading 
of Board papers showed that in terms of the conceptual underpinnings to all subsequent 
work it was actually the first few months, if not weeks, that were crucial. To develop, 
communicate, engage others and hold to a vision are crucial elements of leadership. While 
not all were convinced initially, by the end of 2003 results were tangible. This phase can be 
characterized by ‘iron grip’ leadership and intense ‘up close’ and personal engagement 
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with every aspect of development to drive change, as well as entwining organizational with 
personal integrity (Kraatz, 2009: 65). However, organizations do not necessarily prosper 
with continual ‘iron grip’ leadership or slavish adherence to conceptual frameworks. If 
leaders become rigid, uncreative and believe their own rhetoric it restricts learning, 
adaption and innovation. It prevents a real sense of shared mission, ownership and 
learning. Even as the Chair wrote the statement below, I was conscious of the need to shift 
from managing from the institutional and organizational front to managing through others 
and not to stop learning:  
At the same time as Keystone celebrated its first birthday, Neil Stott, our Chief 
Executive, completed his first year, a challenging year in which he has taken a 
fledgling organization and established a dynamic, fit for purpose Trust. His 
personal contribution to the development of the Trust has been fundamental. 
(Childerhouse, in KDT 2004a) 
As the Annual report 2003-04 (KDT 2004a) illustrates, the conceptual framework was 
embedded in structure, capital and social enterprise project development, as well as direct 
community delivery. Alongside the quieter community work developing on the target 
social housing estates, we ran children and youth performance art festivals. Aiming to 
emulate my early Canterbury experience of achieving legitimacy, the Trust organized a 
carnival to showcase new projects such as the K Team (children), Games Machine (mobile 
video gaming) and Keystone Kollective (youth musicians). To engage local stakeholders it 
was badged as the Mayor’s Carnival. Existing programmes and staff resources were bent 
as far as possible to deliver multiple targeted interventions with disengaged or 
disadvantaged groups focusing on building relationships over time and reflecting what 
people actually wanted, rather than external agencies’ perception of needs.  
3. Entrepreneurial foundations 2004-07 
During 2004-07 Keystone rapidly became a complex hybrid organization and delivered an 
extensive community programme, developed social enterprises and completed numerous 
capital projects(See the Annual reports 2005-08, KDT 2005, 2006a, 2007, 2008 and Trust 
Business Plans 2007-09, KDT 2007b, 2008b, 2009b). The socio-economic rationale was 
presented in a series of in-depth profiles (Carney 2004, a-d) and research reports (Carney, 
2005, Pinto, 2005, Schneider and Holman, 2005). I felt it important to legitimize 
interventions with evidence as well as raise the profile of marginalized groups, such as in 
Youth Speaks: talking to young people in the Keystone area (Jermy, 2005). I framed, 
commissioned, contributed and edited the documents with staff and external researchers. 
The profiles were innovative at the time as they combined data from numerous sources into 
a comprehensive analysis of local circumstances. 
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Cushioned by large public grants and employing over fifty staff, the Trust had the capacity 
to experiment, innovate and to make false starts and mistakes. It was an intense, exciting 
and satisfying period. While the vision remained intact, circumstances often required 
learning, adaption and ‘bricolage’ solutions (Boxenbaum and Rouleau, 2011). With each 
success, confidence grew amongst Trustees and staff that the ambitious programme 
outlined in the Trust Strategic Development Plan 2004-08 (KDT, 2004b) might actually 
come to fruition. However, I was still acutely concerned that the funding clock was ticking 
and delivering new income streams was paramount. The entrepreneurial foundations of the 
Trust rested on using the capital endowment to deliver long-term surpluses and revenue to 
invest in social enterprises. Even with acres of newsprint written on our successes, local 
legitimacy was still an issue, expectations huge and strategic tensions still apparent.  
Asset development 
Most of the assets developed provided space for community or local enterprises and work 
creation, fulfilling our mission but with marginal returns. Underpinned by income from 
public funds, most achieved full tenancy by hosting our own and other agencies’ projects. 
However, the survival rate post-2007 of European/SRB funded projects was debatable, as 
significant income was required. Many of the partner agencies had not taken the same 
strategy as Keystone in trying to deliver funders’ objectives as well as longer-term income 
streams. The partner’s exit strategies stressed ‘mainstreaming’ projects within their core 
operations. My experiences of managing regeneration schemes elsewhere was that exit 
often meant closure, as the agencies could or would not mainstream projects or failed to 
secure further external resources. The loss of projects would have a ‘knock on’ effect on 
the occupation levels of the property portfolio, hence making the Trust financially 
vulnerable. Even full, the property portfolio would not sustain the Trust without the 
Keystone Innovation Centre and that was a leap of faith.  
Completed in 2006, I consider the Keystone Innovation Centre26 as a public work in its 
own right. It embodied the Trust’s ambition and approach; it was also a test of my 
leadership, as sustainability rested on its success. Such an opportunity may not come twice. 
Its development was a severe test of collective will with disputes over design,27 Keystone’s 
direct management, and pricing structure. I considered its prime socio-economic rationale 
was to attract prestige businesses at scale, therefore to have larger units than small start-up 
offices. As a premium business centre the internal quality was paramount and cost-cutting 
was to be resisted. 
                                                            
26 See http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/business/ 
27 Initially rejected by the Planning Committee, with one member describing it as an ‘insult to log cabins’. 
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Quite apart from the learning from implementing numerous capital projects, the experience 
drove home the challenging political and funding context in which entrepreneurial third 
sector organizations operated. Balancing myriad stakeholders’ objectives was difficult, but 
the greatest challenge was achieving legitimacy for the concept of the Keystone Innovation 
Centre primarily as ‘strictly commercial’ and a profit centre. In fact, an increasing degree 
of disconnect between external and internal discourses proved to be pragmatic. The 
Keystone Innovation Centre achieving sustainability was not in dispute; what was in 
dispute was generating significant surplus for reinvestment in the Trust.  
 
Figure 3.4: Keystone Innovation Centre 
Social enterprise 
As the team developed proposals for social enterprises, the ‘dominant tension’ of dual 
goals coupled with place became ever more real. In deciding what to do, normal business 
factors such as product, market, competition and profitability came into play. Laid over 
this was rurality, deficient demand, some Trustees not wanting to compete with existing 
businesses and the spectre of state aid, due to concern that a public subsidy would distort 
markets.28 There was no shortage of social needs to be met through product or process 
enterprises, such as sheltered work or cheap goods, but profit-generating enterprises (over 
                                                            
28 State aid has become a particular bête noir. I have never known any third sector organization to face a 
direct challenge, but it is constantly used by risk adverse public agencies.  
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and above property) remained elusive. I was conscious that reacting to social demand and 
opportunistic pursuit of funding could trigger growth before it was coherently planned 
(Austin et al., 2003), leading to increased sustainability pressures. A holistic approach 
intensifies the temptation to engage in multiple activities across multiple markets. An often 
forgotten ‘cost of entry’ for social enterprises is reputational risk as, given stakeholder 
pressure, divesting social projects is an acute problem. Lack of focus or planned growth in 
the 1960s led to the forerunners of development trusts, the US Community Development 
Corporations (CDC), collapsing ‘of their own weight and ambition’ (Halpern, 1995: 138). 
Financial risk when emphasizing social goals (process and product) is compounded by a 
focus on consumers who ‘are unable to pay enough to cover the costs’ (Austin et al., 2003: 
20).  
Research on development trusts for the Masters increased my gloom. In Between a Rock 
and a Hard Place? Exploring the strategic tensions experienced by development trusts29 
(Stott and Tracey, 2007), we argued that the dual goals enshrined in organizational purpose 
create an inherent tension compounded by place-related tension; it infused all aspects of 
strategy and presented a paradox not reflected in practitioner literature. Learning myopia 
was rampant, overlooking ‘distant times, places and failures’ (Jones, 1998: 415), including 
the CDCs’ experience. Described as ‘a fragile and a vital strategy’ (Halpern, 1995: 145) 
but ‘relatively flexible and enduring’ (ibid: 127), the CDCs constantly battled with the 
dominant tension. The CDCs found that the ‘depleted and unforgiving contexts’ (Halpern, 
1995: 142) with ‘marginal neighbourhoods with marginal populations’ an extreme 
challenge (ibid: 145). Dwarfed by context, even the well-managed and capitalized CDCs 
struggled (ibid: 136). Our conclusion was sobering:  
The evidence overwhelmingly points to the fragility of trusts that are focused solely 
on deprived areas.... Locating contemporary trusts purely in deprived areas has 
more to do with the ‘pull’ towards concentrations of public funding and the ‘push’ 
of policy, than it has to do with community-based initiatives. Trusts would be 
strongly advised to balance prime cash poor beneficiaries with cash rich 
beneficiaries.... The key is differentiating between beneficiaries and customers; 
beneficiaries are local, customers (individuals or organisations) potentially 
anywhere. Automatically equating customers with area of beneficiaries is a self-
defeating strategy. 
...trusts should not allow themselves to ‘be boxed into the regeneration or anti-
poverty corners’ and ’not to be seen as relevant only to poor people, in low income, 
under-invested communities’ (Pearce, 2003: 57). The evidence is unequivocal; 
deprived places can create competitive advantage but rarely sustainability. (Stott 
and Tracey, 2007: 55) 
                                                            
29 The paper built on Stott, 2005. 
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Rather presciently, we suggested that the test would be ‘...when current public funding 
streams cease, and the dress rehearsals are over. The tensions in achieving dual goals in 
deprived places may never be overcome’ (ibid). Mired in the often overwhelming task of 
achieving and sustaining dual goals by March 2007, I had not learnt from my own 
conclusion of the malaise of learning myopia and looked to distant places for more positive 
experiences. A trip to study social enterprises in Oregon proved an antidote. 
St Vincent de Paul Society of Lane County in Eugene30  exemplified the principle of 
balancing cash rich and cash poor beneficiaries through trading outlets and products and 
took it one step further. Focusing on recycling, the Society had achieved scale by capturing 
the waste stream for clothes, books and furniture locally as well as affluent areas of San 
Francisco and Berkeley, transported them to Eugene and sold into numerous local, regional 
and international markets. Moreover, recycled material was reconditioned or made into 
new products such as pet beds (mattresses), architectural glass and eco fire starters 
(candles). Their social enterprises:  
[H]ave a quadruple bottom line: they responsibly reuse and recycle products; 
provide quality goods and services to the community; provide jobs and job training; 
and generate revenue to fund our charitable activities.31 
I was impressed with how they seamlessly balanced enterprise and social mission. Profit 
was recycled into an extensive range of social and housing services. I was less impressed 
how US social policy drove working families into services offering ‘end of the month’ 
food parcels or assistance with rent and healthcare; given the UK Government’s penchant 
for copying US policy, I felt it was a harbinger for what we may have to face.32 I was 
reassured that the organizational structure was similar to Keystone’s, in particular that all 
service/business units were within the charity and functionally separated, recognizing 
teams’ cultural differences. Perhaps the most enduring lesson was how business unit 
leaders were empowered to feel a sense of ownership and responsibility. Organizational 
control was decanted, resulting in high performance with light touch central management, 
unless there were significant problems. Performance metrics were kept simple and 
relevant, and external pressures for complex social audit resisted. For once I had witnessed 
a social enterprise where reality outstripped rhetoric. 
The social enterprises we explored focused on social need and taking advantage of local 
circumstances, resources and national agendas. The Local Food Group was set up to 
                                                            
30 See http: //www.svdp.us/ 
31http: //www.svdp.us/what-we-do/recycling-and-manufacturing/ 
32 Recent welfare ‘reforms’ are likely to push more people to the margins and remove state-funded safety 
nets, leaving it to charities and churches to pick up the pieces. A recent example is the rapid rise in the 
number of Food Banks. 
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provide quality catering using local, seasonal, organic or Fairtrade products. Green 
Ventures Furniture recycled goods at affordable prices with a grant voucher scheme for the 
most in need. The Building Block taught basic carpentry and bricklaying. As Noticas was a 
Portuguese national newspaper, the first in the UK.33 The paper was a major risk, but 
embodied the ambition of the time to break out of the local context and achieve a profit 
oriented social enterprise at scale. False starts included an animal crematorium to meet 
farming and household needs, wood oil production (a high value product used on boats) 
and resurrecting a local technology, Thetford Pulpware,34 to produce ornamental goods. 
While a combination of capacity, time and necessary capital investment halted further 
development, they were all potential ‘breakout’ enterprises engaging with lucrative 
markets while providing work that matched local labour. An opportunity lost, perhaps. The 
pursuit of the ‘magic widget’ to create local jobs at scale continues today. 
Social action 
The Annual reports summarize the numerous social interventions made 2004-07 that 
aimed to provide access, opportunity and mutual aid. We focused on what people wanted 
to do rather than want others felt they should do. Projects like ‘The Big Sitting Room’ 
(small youth venues providing ‘chill out’ space with TV, games and music) and the 
Kollective (young musicians) focused on fun and passion in supportive environments, as 
well as the means to build confidence, soft skills, leadership and tackle issues the young 
people brought up in their own time. As issues emerged, new projects were co-produced 
with participants such as a young parents’ project. Our role was to match needs with public 
policy and resources and create relevant opportunities. 
META: a defining project 
Work with the migrant community led to the co-creation of a project that would 
simultaneously enhance the Trust’s national reputation and stigmatize it locally (Tracey, 
2012b). It led to sustained institutional work to challenge and change discourses and 
practices. It exemplifies the process of adaption and innovation to pressing social needs 
with limited resources, as well as the inherent ‘messiness’ of community engagement. 
In 2004 META was established; Multi-lingual Thetford Association and later Migrant 
Europeans Taking Action. Initially, the community development instinct of the team 
                                                            
33 See http: //www.newswiretoday.com/news/10592/ 
34 Thetford Pulpware produced helmets and household goods made from fibres such as jute or paper; sold 
across the British Empire, the business employed many locals. Plastics killed Pulpware. Light, sturdy and 
largely recyclable, it is a product whose time may yet come. 
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leader, Mark Allison35 and myself was to develop distinct Portuguese and Polish groups 
and work towards a unified ‘migrant solidarity’ approach as confidence grew. Mark’s 
initial fieldwork with the Portuguese highlighted that some of the existing ‘community 
leaders’ increasingly used by the Police and keen to get involved were actually 
unscrupulous gang masters,36  feared by the community. In my experience, it was not 
unusual for self-proclaimed ‘community leaders’ to have other agendas and vigilance was 
essential. Even when we moved to working with volunteers to set up a group for all 
migrants, it became apparent that Keystone would have to have a more direct role to 
maintain accessibility, fairness and transparency. 
When Portugal beat England during Euro 2004, Thetford erupted in violence, with rioting 
outside a Portuguese pub in the town square, which was then besieged by a mob of around 
300. 37  The event had a galvanizing impact on local agencies to tackle ‘community 
cohesion’. However, the lasting impact on me was the behaviour of the national press 
throughout the day. TV coverage began at breakfast outside the pub and I considered the 
tone to be virtual incitement. Many of those arrested came from outside the town and I 
believe were attracted by the reports. Populist reporting on European migration was 
becoming commonplace and was conflated with non-European illegal immigration. The 
silence from those large employers who encouraged migration and the politicians who 
facilitated it was noticeable.38 Silence, in my opinion, gave permission to the increasing 
anti-migrant sentiments. As the migrants felt uncomfortable speaking out, challenging 
perceptions became a personal cause célèbre as well as increasing our social justice role in 
supporting newcomers, even if it impacted on local legitimacy.  
META’s core service provided information, support and guidance to migrants, by 
migrants, as well as the brand for other migrant activity. It was aimed at easing transition 
for the new communities and minimizing potential tensions. Most migrants settled in 
rapidly, but issues such as exploitation, debt, housing and homelessness became prevalent 
as the new communities grew rapidly. What evolved was a series of interventions to 
prevent rather than cure, which entailed engagement with numerous agencies as well as 
designing new services. It also involved agenda raising through the creation of networks 
                                                            
35 Mark had worked in international charities in Africa and was fluent in Portuguese. 
36 Some gang masters not only coordinated labour for employers, but levied workers’ pay for finding work 
and operated as loan sharks.  
37 See http: //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/norfolk/3838531.stm With a background in community safety, I 
had been in the police station to receive assurances that any problems would be managed. I was not 
convinced by the response. The Police were under resourced when the riot began and had to hold off for a 
considerable time before reinforcements from a neighbouring Force arrived. During the event, Mark Allison 
was inside the pub sending me updates. 
38 Employers such as Tesco’s and Bernard Mathews actively recruited in host countries. 
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such as the East of England Development Agencies’ Migrant Steering Group, 39  the 
development of ‘alternative micro-discourses’ (Tracey, 2012b: 21) to change local 
perceptions and contribute to national debates:  
[T]hree national commissions – the Commission in Integration and Cohesion, the 
Audit Commission, and the Commission for Rural Communities – each identified 
Keystone’s approach as one of the best of its kind and presented it as a template for 
other communities to follow. For example, the Commission on Integration and 
Cohesion (2007: 137) stated that Keystone’s ‘community development approach 
has helped it to become one of the most successful migrant worker initiatives in the 
country’. (Tracey, 2012b: 18) 
By 2007, the Polish Consul General could say:  
[This] is a wonderful project that caters for the needs of the migrant communities 
and has the full support of the local community and my office…. However, it 
seems very unique and it is strange that there are not more of these throughout 
Britain and it would be wonderful to have more.40 
However, such plaudits came at a cost. For Hudson, ‘core stigma’ can be attributed to 
organizations because of what it does and who it serves (2008). Keystone has been 
stigmatized by some local stakeholders, although organizations ‘can simultaneously be 
perceived positively by some audiences and negatively by others’ (ibid: 254). The stigma 
is primarily located within target communities and has posed a legitimacy problem. Even 
though META was only a relatively small part of the portfolio, some residents perceived it 
as all we did and, 
If they [Keystone] stopped helping them then they would stop coming. They’re just 
encouraging them to come over. They come because they get all the help…. We 
should look after our own, not the foreigners. (Quoted in Tracey, 2012b: 33) 
Communicating mission, challenges to legitimacy 
While I attempted to communicate intent and puzzle out dilemmas in Trust documents, 
reflected in the lengthy Trust Strategic Development Plan (KDT, 2004c), I increasingly 
simplified how the mission was communicated, since my preoccupations or verbosity did 
not necessarily help public perceptions.  
  
                                                            
39 Mark moved to EEDA to lead the project and it was sponsored by an ex Keystone Chair who had become 
Deputy Chair of EEDA. 
40 Eastern Daily Press, February 3, 2007. 
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The objectives are: 
 To tackle financial exclusion through support, advice, training and job creation 
 To combat social exclusion through empowering individuals, groups and communities  
 To protect the environment through recycling, local procurement and saving historic buildings  
 To generate wealth through property and social enterprise development. 
 
The business model focuses on; 
 Generating a mixed income stream; grants and earned income from property and social enterprises 
 Maintaining a balanced portfolio of core social projects and enterprises 
 Delivering new activity through new income. 
Annual report, 2007 
 
Table 3.2: Trust objectives 
Even with significant success and investment in other projects, some local stakeholders 
continued to characterize the Trust as a ‘quango’ that did not do enough for residents. In a 
rare fit of pique I published an impact account provocatively entitled What has Keystone 
Done for Us? (KDT 2006b), following Monty Python, to the disquiet of senior staff. 
Needless to say, it did not change certain stakeholders’ opinions. 
Passion, pockets and place became our unofficial mantra: doing things people wanted to 
do; getting money into pockets; and the importance of place. Initially I had insisted the 
Keystone brand take precedence, but as the portfolio developed and beneficiaries and 
customers relationships focused on particular services, all were given distinct brands, 
further enhancing team leaders’ sense of ownership. 
As Kapferer argued, ‘brand awareness, image, trust and reputation, all painstakingly built 
up over years, are the best guarantees of future earnings’ (2004: 4). The most severe 
reputational challenge came from strained relationships with a local council. Having 
decided to let go the SRB and European programmes, some officers and members did not 
want to really let go, and challenges to Trust decisions were commonplace. When the 
Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) auditors descended to 
investigate accusations of potential fraud, the Trust suspected the source to be certain 
council officers. Cleared and commended for being ‘best managed third sector 
organization we have encountered’,41 the Board and I confronted the council. This, coupled 
with a poor reception a letter of ours, arguing that the council was not fulfilling its 
obligations to tackle poverty and disadvantage, threatened the relationship.  
Following an acrimonious ‘summit’ meeting, I belatedly realized that conflict would only 
damage Keystone, as legitimacy and access to future resources were inextricably bound up 
with our relationship. Conscious that my own attitudes may have contributed to 
                                                            
41 Confidential letter, DCLG. 
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organizational hostility to the council, I commissioned an external investigation into our 
contribution to the relationship breakdown. Thankfully, the investigation highlighted 
frustration rather than malice. However, considerable effort was required to rebuild 
bridges. The episode reinforced how place, place-based organizations and institutions 
simultaneously constrained and enhanced legitimacy. Marquis et al. argue that the 
community institutional environment and localized isomorphic forces have been 
underestimated in the ‘emergence of social action by corporations’ (2007: 942). I did the 
same from a third sector perspective, and it was not a mistake I made twice.  
4. Approaching sustainability 2007-10 
On March 31st 2007 the major public funding ceased. It is a day etched in my memory. I 
thought we were ready with restructuring to reduce costs and promising income projections 
from property and social enterprises. Perhaps nothing tells the Trust’s story in transiting 
from public to earned income better than the pie charts over page.  
Although income dropped from £3m plus per annum to under £1m (much of the public 
money was capital), by 2008 over 75% was earned through trading and the remainder 
through new grants. In public policy terms it was a success, and was heralded as such. In 
fact, as I suddenly realized, we were actually moving from reliance on grant to property 
(the Keystone Innovation Centre, in particular), which could be problematic if rental values 
fell or large units were left empty.  
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  Rent and room hire   Funding   Social Enterprise sales  Consultancy 
 
Figure 3.5: Trust income 2003-11 
The ‘reality shock’ of 2007 required further rounds of restructuring. Although business 
discipline had been rehearsed, suddenly issues such as cash flow, maximizing income and 
debt management became of paramount importance. The capacity to innovate, take risks 
and make mistakes was curtailed. The luxury of specialized internal management capacity 
(such as information technology and human resources) was removed, moreover the long 
close-down period for the SRB and European programmes required continued expenditure 
without additional income. Green Ventures diversified to recycle bikes, but losses and 
increased competition from national charity chains moving into Thetford resulted in the 
31.03.06 31.03.07
31.03.08 31.03.09
31.03.10 31.03.11
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closure of the furniture enterprise.42 Social projects were slimmed down, in particular 
leisure opportunities for young people. By 2010 the Trust could reinvest surplus from the 
Keystone Innovation Centre into core costs and projects, but the social enterprises made 
marginal surpluses at best and grants still had to be pursued to maintain or extend social 
impact.  
Eager to share learning, and to contribute to macro discourses as well as promote the brand 
and monetize learning to create new income streams, I developed a portfolio of research, 
publications and consultancy that became mutually reinforcing. Internal or commissioned 
research was recycled in publications for a national audience. Building on our reputation, 
knowledge and strengths, consultancy work built up. In turn, this was used for further 
publications. Lacking internal capacity, I developed a network of associates from ex-
colleagues, staff and local universities to build consultancy, research or writing teams, 
often supported by editorial volunteers keen to build their CVs.  
Applying learning: Consultancy 
In the London Borough of Newham Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour Service Review 
(Stott, 2006), I developed a ‘critical friend’ approach to consultancy. I had a rather 
jaundiced view of management consultancy as something commissioned to do others’ 
‘dirty work’; mirroring back management’s intentions with a veneer of external 
independence; and being knowledge brokers (McKenna 2006) who peddled management 
tools. I believed my somewhat unfair characterization was commonly shared and 
consultants were viewed with suspicion. As Newham confirmed:  
To undertake an external review of any organisation presents challenges as the 
consultant frequently experiences varying degrees of cooperation, resistance and 
candour. To review a Service which has experienced a formal investigation and 
imposed change within the last year potentially adds further resistance – including 
questioning why bring in an external reviewer and what added value can they bring. 
(Stott, 2006) 
To me, being a ‘critical friend’ meant developing confidence and relationships rapidly at 
all levels, reserving judgement while doing fieldwork and developing a critique, even if the 
message was unpopular. I also felt it important to be immersed in many of the issues faced 
by others rather than being a full-time consultant. The approach worked, as the client 
director’s response illustrates:  
Your report was exactly what I was looking for, an independent, honest and 
detailed professional view on our area of work. Having talked to many members of 
my staff they respected and enjoyed your open and honest approach. 
                                                            
42 As Noticas also made losses, but was handed over to the editorial team who could secure finances that a 
charity could not, and published until 2011. 
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We will now use your findings and recommendations to re-shape our service.... The 
Council, on behalf of the people of Newham, are in your debt and thank you 
wholeheartedly for your help and professional support in this matter. 
If income is the goal, being a critical friend is not necessarily conducive to sustaining client 
relationships, as I discovered working on Northstowe Community Trust; consultant’s 
papers (Stott, 2008) and Kent youth gatherings and gangs: Full report (Stott et al., 2009b). 
In both cases, even after extensive work, the clients did not particularly appreciate the 
findings. Although perhaps it is the consultant’s lot, the failure to persuade was frustrating. 
The West Thetford Community Consultation (Stott and Stott, 2009) report was not 
circulated to key partners until 2012 because of perceived criticisms of partners. Robust 
methodologies and evidence was clearly not enough if it conflicted with the organizational 
agenda or highlighted issues that the client did not wish to be exposed to the public gaze. 
Since ‘discretion may be the better part of valour’, whilst I still approach consultancy with 
the same attitude, I now spell it out to clients. I tried to incorporate relevant academic 
perspectives in reports such as Flagship Housing Group and community engagement 
(2009) but rapidly found that clients favoured a concise practitioner orientation, as 
demonstrated in West Middlesbrough Neighbourhood Trust: Advice note 3 (Stott, 2009) 
and Westwood and Ravensthorpe Development Trust review (Stott and Flack, 2010). In 
partnership with the DTA’s consultancy, numerous contracts were delivered and the 
learning recycled into: publications,43 presentations and articles44 and in extending the 
Trust’s service portfolio.  
Burns argues that ‘consultants as leaders’ (2010: 72) working across organizational 
boundaries can generate transformational change. The ‘transformational consultancy’ 
process is cyclical combining authority, presence, impact and personal/organizational/field 
impact and reflection (ibid: 73). I would suggest that being a ‘practitioner consultant’ adds 
to authority in fluid fields such as social enterprise or asset transfer. Clients know that the 
consultant is fully engaged with the same issues they are experiencing. The impact of 
consultancy work has been significant, financially, in sharing practice and facilitating 
organizational change, particularly work supporting asset transfers and sustainability 
plans.45 It has been a two-way process, as learning from others has been incorporated into 
organizational practice and publications. 
  
                                                            
43 For instance ‘Managing Financial Risk’ (Stott, 2009). 
44 For instance ‘Eco towns can thrive with trusts’ (Stott, 2008). 
45 See Age UK Eastern region ‘Fit for Purpose’, review for Age UK Suffolk (Stott, 2011). 
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Creating and disseminating knowledge: Keystone publications 
Keystone’s first nationally oriented publication, Workers on the Move: migrant workers, 
growth and housing in the eastern region (Wiles et al., 2008), engaged head on with the 
increasingly acrimonious discourse around European migration. It sought to challenge 
myths and institutional norms through engaged scholarship consisting of a fusion of 
practitioners and academics. Although engaged in institutional work regionally to promote 
the economic benefits of migration, I was angered by the experiences of META clients, the 
silence from the main beneficiaries (employers) and the unhelpful contributions from 
Ministers.46 If others would not stand up in public, I was determined that Keystone should. 
Collaborating with likeminded funders and a Board prepared to take risks, the publication 
provided a blueprint for all subsequent publications, with multi-disciplinary writing teams; 
an evidence base; a challenge to public policy; a challenge to institutions and promotion of 
alternatives. The links with academia were particularly important, bringing rigour, critique 
and legitimacy. Of course, the publications also showcased Keystone’s work and 
contributed to the national brand recognition so crucial in securing new income.  
Learning from the Past? Building community in New Towns and growth areas (Stott, M. et 
al., 2009) originated in the frustration generated by my consultancy experiences and asked:  
Do we learn from the past or make the same mistakes and continually re-learn 
lessons that were evident to our regeneration forebears? Do we ‘talk the community 
talk’ prior to new regeneration schemes only to see our aspirations unravel as 
schemes progress? (ibid: 4) 
The publication sought to be a primer in community development approaches as well as to 
argue that we did not learn; it also crystallized a concept of community infrastructure to 
explain the symbiotic relationship between people, places and property that I felt to be the 
bedrock of building resilient communities (ibid: 18) and subsequently integrated into the 
Trust’s approach. 
Emerging from the everyday practice within META of linking individuals to health 
services, Workers on the Move 3: European migrant workers and health in the UK: The 
evidence. (Collis et al., 2010b, 2010c) built on Workers on the Move 2 (Collis et al., 2010a) 
to counter myths of ‘health tourism’ and understand migrant health needs. I believe it made 
a significant contribution to local health discourses and the first in depth analysis involving 
primary research with migrants. It also exemplified co-production of ideas with 
sympathetic health professionals, META staff and migrants. 
                                                            
46 Including Margaret Hodge and Gordon Brown (see Wiles et al., 2008, pp. 9, 12). 
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The publications’ strengths were: they were rooted in everyday practice; informed by 
academic discourses and thoroughly researched. For Tracey, the publications contributed 
to the Trust’s efforts to undermine dominant macro cultural discourses and create 
alternative micro-narratives (2012: 21). I took particular pride in the fact that a relatively 
small organization could mobilize internal and external resources to make such 
interventions, as well as deriving personal satisfaction from maintaining intellectual 
engagement with academic colleagues. 
Disseminating learning: Films and social media 
Initiated by The Asset Transfer Unit, a series of films featuring the Trust’s work was 
commissioned to provide learning materials for policy makers and practitioners and linked 
to You Tube and Facebook groups. The films are presented as supporting evidence to 
illustrate socio-economic interventions (see Appendix i). 
Engaging with Government 
In 2008 I was appointed to the National Community Forum (NCF), the DCLG’s 
Ministerial sounding board on poor communities. My most important contribution47 was to 
advocate research, to facilitate access within Thetford, and to contribute to editorial 
discussions on a report on ‘white poor’ communities and sources of resentment to 
minorities (Garner et al., 2009). The research provided an important contribution to 
problematizing the issue, potential solutions and stimulus for further studies (Garner, 
2011). However, the nuances of the report were lost in increasingly racialized political 
interventions and press coverage, 48  not least conerning the fact that many European 
migrants were white poor (Bates, 2011). It was a salutary lesson in how politics can trump 
considered discourse. If anything, the reaction to the report and the Secretary of State’s 
focus on the ‘betrayal’ of the ‘ignored poor’ intensified anti-migrant opinion, compounding 
local legitimacy problems. 
Applying innovation: Asset counterweight strategy 
External agencies often offered to transfer ‘assets’ such as redundant churches, public 
buildings or community centres. The expectation was that a third sector organization could 
reduce costs and ensure viability - a chimera, as most were located in poor places, were 
aging and required substantial investment. Accompanied by restrictive covenants, I 
                                                            
47 Apart from telling a junior Minister that Labour’s policy was ‘accumulating not accumulative’ in poor 
places. 
48 See, for instance, http: //www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1104046/Britains-betrayed-white-working-
classes-believe-immigrants-receive-better-treatment.html; http: //www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/ news/ 
2089249/White-working-class-ignored.html;  
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considered most to be liabilities rather than assets. When dealing with marginal property or 
land and limited resources it is an uphill task to make a scheme workable, as the time, costs 
and creativity required are immense.  
While investigating how to make a community centre viable, I suggested a scheme to 
knock it down, rebuild on a smaller-scale and accompany it with a housing scheme,49 
conceptualized as a counterweight strategy. The strategy involved a liability being 
transferred with land or property that could generate income to cross-subsidize the running 
costs and activities of community facilities. The land or property did not necessarily have 
to be on the same site as the more economically viable the better. Such an arrangement 
meant that a local authority did not have to continue with revenue support. The irony was 
that councils frequently cross-subsidized property within their portfolio or adopted a 
similar approach for housing developments, but resisted the idea of transferring income-
generating land or property to underpin a third sector organization’s revenue. With St 
John’s in Mildenhall, the council was persuaded: four schemes, several years and 
numerous partners later, the scheme should achieve planning permission in 2012. Keystone 
will own two houses to rent and have the new centre.  
I applied the learning to numerous asset transfer consultancy projects and attempted to 
influence the discourse through giving evidence to commissions, writing case studies and 
influencing local authorities. The work resulted in securing a £50k grant to advise third 
sector organizations across the region in 2010 (see Stott and Allison, 2011) and new 
partnerships to deliver counterweight projects.  
5. Innovation within austerity 2010-12 
By 2009 it was apparent that the Trust’s strategy was reasonably sound. Within an 
unforgiving context, core socio-economic projects could be sustained through trading 
activity and targeted grant funding. On the cusp of being able to invest more in new 
projects, the management team provided the capacity to innovate, take risks and make 
provocative interventions into national discourses. Local legitimacy had been strengthened 
through sustained interventions and engagement with local forums. I felt the Trust had 
truly become an entrepreneurial third sector organization. Then the financial world caved 
in. 
Public austerity, coupled with a new Government that envisaged civic society providing 
services as the state retreated, has created opportunity and threats. Opportunities arose 
from public divestment of services and assets that third sector organizations could deliver 
                                                            
49 See http: //www.atu.org.uk/Stories/StJohns for a summary of the scheme. 
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if it was financially viable to do so. Threats were a reduction of resources available to third 
sector organizations that primarily rely on public grants, as well as the impact of service 
reduction on vulnerable people and places.  
Well positioned to take advantage of opportunities and not over-reliant on public monies, I 
advocated continued growth while continually reviewing efficiency and effectiveness. If 
the worst happened, the Trust could retrench and be totally sustainable, albeit with less 
social delivery and senior staff, including myself. As the financial crisis intensified, the 
Trust explored new alliances, areas of business and challenges to social policy; innovation 
and adaptation became a necessity rather than a choice. 
Challenging the Big Society 
Alarmed by the aspirational but incoherent policy push for a Big Society, I persuaded 
funders to support a critical contribution early in the debate whereby 22 academics and 
practitioner authors wrote papers on a voluntary basis. Produced rapidly and on a 
shoestring, coordination was like herding cats and the final edit was daunting. Nationally 
launched 50  in 2011, The Big Society Challenge (Stott, M. 2011) was distributed to 
Ministers, senior politicians and ‘thought leaders’ across the UK. Received well, the book 
was extensively commented on in reviews and blogs. For Caan, it was ‘the most 
controversial book I have read in a long time’51 and the Faith-based Regeneration Network 
added; 
This has to be one of the few books which successfully draws together a range of 
opinion alongside a detailed and objective resource of factual information about 
Big Society.52 
In the paper Big Society, Poor Places, Longhurst (an ex-staff member) and I laid out our 
rather jaundiced opinions of a succession of isomorphic ‘viral concepts’ and the impact on 
poor places. The paper provides a concise summation of my professional learning and 
intellectual contributions. Impassioned and somewhat polemic at times, Big Society, Poor 
Places combined informed critique with potential alternatives. It also foreshadowed a call 
for improved local institutions for poorer places built on long-term alliances of public, 
private and entrepreneurial third sector organizations that coloured my subsequent work. 
  
                                                            
50 See http: //locality.org.uk/resources/community-voices-explore-big-society-challenge-book-keystone/ 
51 http: //www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=415407&sectioncode=26 
52 http: //www.fbrn.org.uk/reading/big-society-challenge 
52 
The Place Makers 
The counterweight principle, ensuring that within any transfer or cluster of transfers there 
is real income generation potential that can be utilized to cross-subsidize more vulnerable 
facilities or services, was central to the regional project ‘The Place Makers’. Elizabeth 
Truss MP wrote, 
The Place Makers has been an innovative project led by Keystone which I hope 
will prove a useful model for local communities and groups to provide community 
infrastructure and services. 
There are currently so many assets lying un- or underused that can be given a new 
lease of life by people willing to take a risk or put in new energy. The Place Makers 
has given assistance to local organisations in finding sustainable ways to deliver 
local services while providing support on the transfer of assets to communities. 
(Quoted in Stott and Allison, 2011: 3) 
The project supported numerous groups and provided strategic advice to local authorities. 
It also generated significant evidence to critique policy and contribute to the burgeoning 
asset transfer discourse. The shift from demand (by community groups) to supply-led 
(public disposal within austerity) was flooding the ‘community asset marketplace’ with 
uneconomic property. Unrealistic ‘hyper-expectations’ by local authorities, isomorphic 
pressure to become asset-based social enterprises and forgetting assets are often ‘for life, 
not just Christmas’, all put sustainable transfers at risk ( Stott and Allison, 2011: 32). 
The learning was applied to subsequent requests for advice, consultancy projects and 
engagement with national forums and also led to new opportunities and alliances. It 
illustrates the fusion of concepts, testing learning in the field and making the most of 
limited resources to generate innovative solutions.  
Market shaping: Work and aspirations 
Austerity brings increased social need. I became increasingly worried about rising 
unemployment and the ability of local people to compete in a diminishing labour market, 
and also the Trust’s contribution. Approached by private sector-led consortia to deliver 
Government work programmes, I was concerned about colluding with increasingly 
punitive social policy as well as the ability to deliver at the fees offered. Building on 
previous practice of combining a review of the issues, research and pilots, Keystone 
embarked on a series of projects aimed at co-producing interventions with local people that 
focused on trust and relationships rather than coercion. 
In Work Matters: Work, worklessness and community: A review of the issues (Collis et al., 
2011) we sought to understand how policy impacted on poor places. From early 
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experiences with adult Work Clubs and Volunteer 2 Work 53  and primary research, 
Supporting Those Furthest From the Labour Market: The Keystone Approach (Tracey et 
al., 2011) and Supporting Volunteers (Patterson et al., 2011) were developed. The former 
built on my own research interests in organizational socialization (Stott, 2010) and 
dialogue with Paul Tracey who was undertaking a nine-month ethnographic study of 
Keystone. It is a clear articulation of the Trust’s ethos to socio-economic interventions:  
We focus in particular on supporting people at the margins of society who appear to 
many agencies as the ‘hardest to reach’, who have fallen through cracks of formal 
support structures, who live in the poorest communities, and who feel they have 
been abandoned. The approach that we have developed has proved very effective at 
improving the lives of this group of unemployed people.  
There is no mystery to what we do. Our success is rooted in three simple principles. 
First, we consider our clients as individuals with distinct aspirations and 
expectations, who require tailored solutions. Second, we think about people at the 
margins as resources to be developed rather than problems to be solved. Third, we 
take the time to build trusting relationships that are underpinned by positive 
reinforcement rather than threats or sanctions. (Tracey et al., 2011: 2) 
What was proposed was an alternative to prevalent ‘carrot and stick’ solutions to 
worklessness. Although more resource intensive, it resonated better with how people 
wished to be treated by support agencies. In effect, we tried to shape rather than respond to 
the market. The work club concept was ‘sold’ to numerous local authorities. With Suffolk 
County Council (SCC), school-based work clubs were developed to pilot new approaches 
to reduce the number of young people Not in Employment, Education or Training 
(NEETs). SCC had invested significant resources in the past with mixed results. Further 
co-production with Raising Employment Aspirations and Expectations Among Young 
People in Suffolk: The Aspirations Escalator Project (Mobbs et al., 2011) led to a pilot 
community aspirations project combining research and multiple interventions (Leonard 
and Stott, 2012).  
Although successful and popular, support in finding work only goes so far. The problem 
remains if there is little suitable work to find. With the ‘magic widget’ still illusive, I began 
to create an alliance with two counties to develop a youth employment social enterprise 
focused on county farm holdings, in essence creating social premium products to be sold 
into affluent markets.  
  
                                                            
53 Practical training in bike refurbishment within Green Ventures Bikes, coupled with the development of soft 
skills like time-keeping and team work. 
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Alliances 
Isomorphic pressures have pushed public and third sector organizations to adopt business 
practices since the 1990s and today entrepreneurialism is in vogue (Eikenberry and Kluver, 
2004). The hybridization of the third sector, a ‘mix of value creation’ (Battilana et al., 
2012: 9) is on the increase (c.f Billis, 2010). According to Battilana et al., the essence of 
the ‘hybridization movement’ ‘is a fundamental convergence and reconfiguration of the 
social and commercial sectors, from completely separate fields to a common space’ (ibid: 
10). In the UK there is increased hybridity within the public sector as it develops new 
income streams through commercial projects, as well as mutuals and social enterprises to 
divest services. This represents a return, perhaps, to the municipal socialism (or ‘gas and 
water socialism’) pioneered by Birmingham in the early twentieth century (Hunt, 2004: 
250). The private sector also competes in the policy pound marketplace and is not immune 
to isomorphic pressures to be more socially responsible (Marquis et al., 2007), or to 
integrate social and commercial logics (Battilana, et al., 2012). The development trust 
experience is that achieving hybridization is challenging and does not yet ‘offer a bold, 
sustainable infusion of humanitarian principles into modern capitalism’ (ibid: 11). Blurring 
boundaries brings the threat of increased competition for entrepreneurial third sector (as 
public or private driven hybrids usually have more resources at their disposal), but also the 
opportunity to innovate. 
The SCC examples above illustrate a successful alliance to innovate and secure new 
resources: co-production through shared values and expertise. However, issues of trust and 
power remain prevalent between the public and third sectors (Stott and Longhurst, 2011: 
105). Boundaries tend to be conflicted, complex and in flux. Negotiating new institutions, 
service or organizational forms is a considerable challenge. The distinct logics of 
community and commerce are ingrained. The capacity of small organizations to innovate 
though alliances is constrained and costs of entry high. As De Domenico et al. argue, while 
local authorities view social enterprises as ‘means to achieve flexibility in contracting out 
services’, they do not necessarily pay the ‘private sector premium’ (2009: 989), which 
inhibits the accumulation of surpluses. Many third sector organizations only consider 
alliances within the sector in extremis (mergers) or when pushed by state policy, such as 
recent infrastructure organization consortium funding. However, alongside new asset and 
social enterprise development I see alliance-building across sectors as a key means of 
delivering mission and sustainability into the future. Even unsuccessful attempts (such as a 
shared company for the delivery of a council’s community services) increase trust and 
create unsuspected opportunities. One approach is to create shared hybrids, the other is to 
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maximize the added value each sector can bring to shared projects with complementary 
objectives. For instance, a local council is investing in building a hotel or cinema complex 
with food outlets to regenerate a town centre. The investment will be recouped through 
long-term leases in the private sector. Keystone intends to deliver social value through the 
creation of a local food social enterprise restaurant that employs and trains young people. 
Keystone 2012 
As the Trust approaches its tenth birthday, I believe it has made significant socio-economic 
interventions and engaged in institutional work in pursuit of its social justice mission. 
According to Tracey:  
I have conducted research on social and community enterprise since 2003, and have 
studied many different kinds of social venture... [in] my judgement.... Keystone has 
done remarkably well since its inception almost nine years ago. Indeed, it has been 
more successful than any other equivalent community enterprise that I have seen in 
the UK (what I did not appreciate before my time here is the distinctive challenges 
involved in rural community enterprise, which makes commercial revenue 
generation much harder than in urban settings).  
Working in challenging circumstances in an increasingly difficult financial climate, 
the staff and the Board should take much satisfaction in what they have 
accomplished.... I have seen first-hand that Keystone is making a real difference to 
the community it serves.... On the commercial side, the strategy to focus in the 
early years on using public money to invest in assets in order (as far as possible) to 
achieve a degree of financial sustainability has paid dividends. Indeed, it has 
allowed Keystone to develop in a way that few other rural community enterprises 
have been able to do. (2012c: 2) 
Sustainability remains a key aspect of the financial and leadership considerations in 
achieving that. To be able to respond to increasing social need the Trust has to secure new 
income amidst a perfect storm of reducing public and philanthropic grants, as well as 
declining demand for rental space and other services. Considerable organizational work 
continues in improving financial performance in addition to new projects and alliances (see 
the current ‘transformation strategy’ in KDT, 2011b). While the Board continues to invest 
in staff, it could retrench and weather the storm rather than take continued risks. As Tracey 
points out:  
Keystone’s success is anchored in its leadership; Keystone has a very strong senior 
management team with complementary skills. Keystone is somewhat vulnerable to 
the departure of any of them. (ibid) 
Through Trustee development, devolved leadership and co-production, I have attempted to 
develop a succession strategy. Disentangling perceptions of personalized leadership and a 
degree of dependence (both personally and for others) is a challenge. As Farquhar points 
out, the bond is an emotional one with accompanying loss and uncertainty when broken 
(1994). I enjoy leading the organization and have invested considerable time and energy, 
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as a leader should. There is always another challenge to overcome or the time is never right 
to move on. I have demonstrated that Keystone is co-produced, but perceptions remain that 
as ‘founding’ Chief Executive my role is central to its future. This is not uncommon in 
small organizations, be they charities or private sector businesses, in particular, family 
businesses.  
Succession is always traumatic for both parties if the leader is seen as particularly 
effective. The departing leader can feel guilty that they are leaving the organization in the 
lurch. The organization can feel resentful and anxious. For Farquhar, planned succession 
reduces the risks of emotional trauma and includes good communication and a focus on the 
mission and the future (ibid: 45). Ensuring that the organization can seamlessly continue its 
long-term mission to serve vulnerable beneficiaries has to be the overriding concern. 
Clearly no-one is irreplaceable, but for a serving leader to downplay their importance to an 
organization is not necessarily easy. Personal identity and worth is inextricably tied up 
with being the leader. I suggest that the key to succession is confidence: the confidence of 
Boards in their own abilities, and in the wider staff team. Furthermore, confidence needs to 
be engendered in key partners that succession will not disrupt services. This confidence 
can only be nurtured if the leader demonstrates Mintzberg’s ‘engaged management’, which 
puts the organization before self-interest (2004). I would hope this reflects my leadership 
style. On balance, I believe Keystone to be robust enough to make the transition if 
necessary, and its values, mission and impact sustained.  
Still between a rock and a hard place? 
Reflecting on the public works has brought me to the conclusion that place-oriented 
entrepreneurial third sector organizations are still well and truly between a rock and a hard 
place. On one level it is symptomatic of attempting to fuse institutional logics within a 
hybrid organization. As Tracey et al. argue, ‘it is a particularly complex form of 
institutional entrepreneurship’ as the different logics ‘may have little in common and may 
even be on conflict’ ( 2011: 60). The literature focuses on the fusion of community or 
social and market logics but, as Greenwood et al. (2011) argue, organizations may have to 
contend with multiple logics. I would suggest that development trusts also attempt to 
combine elements of a public logic, as the local state retreats and public assets such as 
parks and service hubs, as well as aspects of political engagement (for instance youth 
work) are divested. For Greenwood et al., ‘attention to how non-market institutions and 
logics might influence economic transactions has been particularly missing’ (forthcoming). 
This is certainly the case in the literature on entrepreneurial third sector organizations.  
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I prefer Kraatz’s term, ‘pluralistic organization’, to ‘hybrid’. Organizations are built on the 
‘fault lines’ of institutional logics (2009: 71) and have the opportunity to ‘develop a unique 
and distinctive diachronic character as they attempt to work out their (externally produced) 
internal tensions (ibid: 72). Pluralistic organizations have to embrace complexity, 
stakeholders who ascribe it with different logics and that legitimacy ‘rests upon a number 
of distinct macro-institutional foundations’ (ibid: 71). Such organizations do require 
pluralistic leadership drawing on management theory and practice from across the sectors,  
a challenge academia has yet to address. 
The fault lines are becoming contested as isomorphic pressures are moving public and 
private actors towards becoming virtuous organizations, assuming the perceived virtue of 
the third sector. While a potential threat to the existing entrepreneurial third sector, it is not 
necessarily detrimental if new pluralistic organizations manage to sustain public services 
and are value-driven. I take issue with the assumed virtue inherent in adding ‘social’ or 
‘community’ to an enterprise or in becoming a charity or Community Interest Company. 
Assuming the virtuous mantle does not necessarily make any organization fair, democratic 
or cooperative, including extant third sector organizations. Without public subsidy, I 
suspect new actors will experience the same tensions and sustainability issues. I also 
suspect leaders emerging from the public or private sector will face similar challenges to 
those I faced in the transition. 
The key pressures on place-based third sector organizations are public austerity and 
increased isomorphic pressures to rescue services or buildings. Public austerity has 
intensified the retreat of the state from delivering universal welfare services as well as 
paring back statutory and ceasing many discretionary services. Public austerity adds to the 
impoverishment of poor people and places as public, cultural and community infrastructure 
declines, as well as income levels. It accelerates the decline of ‘principled agents’ within 
communities who emphasize service rather than self, in other words public servants. It also 
accelerates the demolishment of networks and cross-logic forums that were important sites 
for institutional work such as regional agencies and Local Strategic Partnerships. The 
emergent institutional logic of the state is ‘don’t turn to us, sort it out yourself’. The 
localism agenda brings numerous ‘community rights’, but not necessarily the resources to 
apply such rights in poor places. Without the public pound to sustain activity, many third 
sector organizations will struggle to deliver their mission as social need increases. Many 
are mimicking development trusts in a turn to asset-backed income streams as the coercive 
pressure of public cuts intensifies. Many also face local isomorphic pressures to rescue 
services, as well as instinctively wanting to react to need. 
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For entrepreneurial third sector-based in poor places, the trauma of austerity is likely to 
impact on the ability to deliver a pluralistic strategy, let alone innovate. However, in the 
face of adversity, I believe that the institutional and organizational work to create or 
sustain socio-economic interventions has to be intensified. As Crutchfield and McLeod 
Grant argue, in ‘tumultuous times’ the real power lies in connecting the dots, collaborating, 
and leveraging the power of networks and relationships (2012: 7). It will require a new 
form of pluralistic leadership that can negotiate institutional logics, create value-driven 
alliances, and capitalize on sparse opportunities and experiment. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented Keystone Development Trust as a public work. It has focused 
on the institutional and organizational work undertaken to develop and sustain the Trust. 
Using a retrospective framework it has outlined the process of critiquing and reformulating 
the institutional logics that frame development trusts and social enterprises; in particular 
tackling the tensions and paradoxes inherent in models that attempt to mix value creation. 
It has provided an overview and reflection on the organizational and personal journey and 
presented a range of evidence in support of the claim that an organization is a public work. 
While they are public works in their own right, the documents, publications and projects 
were created to fulfil organizational mission. In other words they are to understand, 
enhance or explain the experiences of an organization seeking to deliver holistic socio-
economic impact within a challenging context. Over and above the impact on beneficiaries, 
Keystone as a public work has been a site of experimentation, creativity and innovation. As 
such, it has contributed to knowledge generation and the cumulative experience of 
entrepreneurial third sector organizations who occupy a precarious space. It has also 
contributed to discourses around social justice, the creation and maintenance of community 
and reconceptualization of the relationship between the state, economy and place. It has 
demonstrated that, to make lasting change, organizational work, institutional work and 
socio-economic interventions occur simultaneously. This insight will be explored further in 
the concluding chapter. 
This chapter has also highlighted the interplay between a personal contribution through 
leadership and the intellectual struggle to problematize, adapt and innovate, and co-
production. While I believe that organizations are co-produced, co-production requires an 
enabling leadership ethos and the ability to be reflexive. My substantive contribution has 
been to blend experience, experimentation and academic study to provide actionable 
insights as well as create the space for co-production. Community organization’s 
legitimacy and impact depends on co-production with stakeholders. Keystone as a public 
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work also demonstrates that co-production alliances between practitioners and academia 
enhance an organization’s ability to learn. 
Keystone is a public work in progress. Like all organizations it has continually to adapt and 
innovate to ensure it can fulfil its mission. The concluding chapter reflects on my 
professional and personal contribution as well as the theoretical framework of the mutually 
reinforcing organizational work, institutional work and socio-economic interventions. 
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4. Reflections on the Public Works 
 
Preparing this submission for a professional doctorate has provided an invaluable 
opportunity to reflect on an organizational, professional and personal journey that has been 
simultaneously daunting and exciting. As a public work, Keystone has a ‘unique and 
distinctive diachronic character’ (Kraatz, 2009: 72) and made a sustained contribution to 
the wellbeing of its beneficiaries. I have demonstrated how my professional and personal 
development has contributed to a value-driven, co-production approach to leadership and 
creation of the public works. Part of the Keystone culture no doubt reflects my own 
ideology, idiosyncrasies and obsessions, however my overriding concern has been to create 
and sustain an organization that will continue to deliver social value through 
entrepreneurship long after its founders have moved on.  
Making change 
The public works and reflection on them within this statement has provided evidence of the 
changes made through my professional practice. As Chief Executive I have facilitated 
change at an individual or locality level (beneficiaries), organizational level (internal and 
external) and field levels (the ‘movement’). For recent UNICEF visitors, the Trust 
exemplifies 'courage, creativity and ability to flex.'54 
Combining intellectual engagement and practice has considerably improved my awareness, 
leadership and impact. I would suggest that my leadership is ‘embodied’, combining 
values, anger directed at social injustice and a will to make a difference: emotional 
leadership with intrinsic motivation (Goleman, 2004). Intrinsic motivation underpins the 
resilience required to cope with the frustrations, setbacks and awareness that as an 
individual and organization you can never do enough, but never enough is better than 
nothing. Embodied leadership is not unique to the third sector, but it is crucial in sustaining 
it. As embodied leaders are often ‘dissatisfied with existing practices’ (Zietsma and 
McKnight 2009: 196), it also sustains institutional work as ‘most disruption and creation 
are conditional upon lowered investment in or disinvestment from the current institutional 
order’ (Voronov and Vince, 2012: 66). Embodied leaders within pluralistic organizations 
faced with conflicting institutional demands could acquiesce and imitate institutional 
models that appear to work; compromise (balance competing demands or privilege one 
over others); defy and challenge; or manipulate ‘to influence the definition of norms 
                                                            
54 E mail from R. Hill, Judge Business School 
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through active lobbying or, more radically, to control the source of pressure’ (Pache and 
Santos, 2010: 463). Although defiance and manipulation are ‘more risky for organizations 
which may lose institutional support in the process’ (ibid: 464), I would argue that for 
organizations serving marginalized communities it is an essential element of making 
change. 
Conscious that organizations are co-produced and the personal aggrandisement may lead to 
enhanced job prospects, but rarely an ‘engaged management that cares’ (Mintzberg in 
Kleiner, 2010), I have tried to work through others and nurture talent. This is increasingly 
true as the organization matures and develops its own logics. To avoid the ’forever leader’ 
pitfalls (Farquhar, 1994), since embarking on the Doctorate in Professional Studies I have 
given particular attention to internal capacity building. I was also reminded of the 
importance of networks, as ‘establishing influence and authority may require the activation 
or cultivation of networks’ (Rojas, 2010: 1276). Austerity has disrupted longstanding 
formal networks, but through building new alliances and judicious use of personal 
networks Keystone still manages to exert influence disproportionate to its size. The 
challenge now is to strengthen the capacity to network through Trustees and staff, as well 
as creating new formal networks with external partners. 
Conscious that organizations can ossify into an accumulation of customs of practices or 
become a ‘self-licking lollipop’ (one that perpetuates itself for internal, rather than external 
benefit), I actively encourage self, internal and external critique. Leadership accounts often 
privilege unswerving confidence and decisiveness, but rarely stress doubt and uncertainty. 
Uncertainty has been central to the Keystone experience and doubt over the ability to 
operationalize the model is a fundamental driver, as this submission demonstrates. 
A key role I and colleagues have played is in translating knowledge, defined by Straus et 
al. as:  
[A] dynamic and iterative process that includes the synthesis, dissemination, 
exchange and ethically sound application of knowledge... a move beyond the 
simple dissemination of knowledge into actual use of knowledge. (2009: 165) 
As Chapter 4 and the supportive evidence illustrate, knowledge translation has been 
integral to my approach and the Trust’s work since inception. The process has improved 
and intensified over time. I am particularly proud of our contributions on migration and 
work that have translated into effective local action. According to Tracey:  
I have seen first-hand that Keystone is making a real difference to the community it 
serves. While it is making a strong contribution in many areas, I would point in 
particular to two sets of activities that are having an especially significant effect. 
The first is the works clubs. I... spoke with many of the clients, who told me that 
the work clubs had made a real difference to their lives. In addition to helping 
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people find work, the work clubs play a crucial role in helping to build confidence 
and self-esteem. What’s more, the results have been achieved with remarkably 
limited resources. 
Second, it is clear that META is offering a valuable service for migrant workers in 
Thetford and surrounding areas. In the interviews I conducted with META clients I 
was repeatedly told that without the support of Keystone there would no formal 
support in place at all for migrant workers. I realise that some in the community 
have questioned whether Keystone should develop services to support this 
particular group, but I have met some very vulnerable people who have been the 
victim of exploitation, and would have continued to be so were it not for 
interventions on the part of Keystone. (2012.c: 2) 
Collaboration and co-production has proven to be an organizational strength. Cultivating a 
sense of ownership and the co-production of products and services, following the St 
Vincent de Paul example, has ensured the commitment and growth of staff. Creating co-
production alliances with funders has proved to be more effective than a more traditional 
client/ contractor role. Although time-consuming, it has led to the design, implementation 
and adaptation of services that have had significant impact and are increasingly co-
produced with beneficiaries.  
Keystone’s research and publications have demonstrated the impact of translating 
knowledge, not least the dissemination of alternative discourses and turning knowledge 
into action. Without co-production through external networks, most of the public works 
would not have been possible. The success of the works lies in the fusion of academic and 
practitioner perspectives, as well as giving a voice to vulnerable beneficiaries through local 
research.55 Engaged scholarship is a ‘collective achievement’ (Van de Ven, 2007: 297) that 
aims to overcome the partial specialized knowledge of academics and practitioners to 
create knowledge co-production to tackle complex problems (ibid: 4). Embedding an 
engaged scholarship approach within an organization focused on doing has not been 
without challenges. Practitioner and academic worlds can be insular and self-reinforcing 
(op.cit). Practitioners are focused on rapidly making sense of complexity, simplifying it, 
finding ‘answers’ and action. Academics can be perceived as unduly complicating issues 
and offering more uncertainty than clarity. Audiences, language and outputs (for instance 
papers versus policy documents) are also very different. Within Keystone I have attempted 
to communicate the added value of engaged scholarship and create works that are 
theoretically informed and of practical use. Future publications will follow Workers on the 
                                                            
55 Access to such voices has been built on the trust and relationships created overtime. Keystone, given its 
ability to reach people and places others cannot, has also hosted numerous research projects, for instance 
research with migrants by: the Equalities and Human Rights Commission; Universities of East Anglia. Kent 
and Cambridge. This would not have been possible with Eastern European communities without trust (as 
well as having staff with the appropriate language skills) as many are reluctant to engage with state agencies 
or concerned how information may be used. 
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Move 3, which was accompanied by a separate short research briefing modelled on the 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation’s approach.56 
A further strength is the willingness to engage with contentious issues and put the 
organization ‘over the parapet’. This is not unique, but I get the impression that it is 
uncommon, for third sector organizations’ sustainability increasingly rests on acquiescence 
with public policy and the pursuit declining resources. Reflecting on this public work and 
the challenges ahead, a next project will be another multi-authored book, Challenging 
localism: austerity, economy and community, which aims to problematize the ‘community 
rights’ enshrined in the Localism Act 2011.57 
Making change has not come without organizational and personal challenges. Legitimacy, 
reputation and status are organizational resources to be nurtured and protected, but are also 
the product of social judgements. Institutional theory has privileged organizational work in 
legitimacy construction, regarding stakeholder ‘audiences’ as passive (Bitektine, 2011: 
151). In fact, social judgements can be ‘a matter of life and death for an organization’ 
(ibid: 152) as well as impacting on vulnerable beneficiaries. Social judgements are formed 
around the following dimensions of legitimacy: procedural (processes such as governance); 
consequential (outcomes); structural (morally favourable form); personal (leader’s 
charisma); and linkages with highly legitimate external actors (ibid: 156). While conscious 
of the stakeholders’ role in creating legitimacy, on reflection more attention needs to be 
given to different audience’s perceptions and how they form judgements about the Trust.  
Conceptual frameworks 
While unique and distinctive in its local context, the Trust is one of many struggling with 
similar issues. Far from heroic, our collective endeavours on the fault lines of institutional 
logics (Kraatz, 2009) are fragile and tentative, riven with paradoxes and uncertainty. 
Motivation for such work is partly the satisfaction of emotional needs (Voronov and Vince, 
2012), such as ‘feeling good about doing good’, but primarily about creating new 
relationships between people, places and the market built on mutual aid and solidarity. 
In understanding the contribution to creation of new knowledge I am mindful of Loch’s 
concerns:  
[I]impact comes neither from building theories in back rooms (these inevitably 
remain dry and sterile) nor from touting experience in ‘war stories’ (experience 
often does not hold up under different circumstances or with a different person). 
Impact comes from combining both. (2012) 
                                                            
56 See http: //www.jrf.org.uk/publications 
57 See http: //www.communities.gov.uk/communities/communityrights/ 
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What Keystone as a public work contributes is a conscious attempt to problematize, 
experiment, create and disseminate organizational knowledge rather than purely ‘peaches 
and cream’ (Pharoah et al. 2004. 29) rhetoric. One strength has been the alliances and 
personal engagement with academia that have tempered the ‘war stories’ and provided an 
external critical gaze. 
Kraatz argues that ‘individual organizations are important venues for institutional work’ 
(Kraatz, 2009: 84 – author’s emphasis), however the ‘paradox of embedded agency’ 
remains. If institutions shape and constrain, how can actors make change (Battilana and 
D’Aunno, 2009)? Following Marti and Meir (2009), one approach is to understand when 
agency is possible and avoid ‘tilting at windmills’. I would suggest that when working on 
the fault lines or with stigmatized and disadvantaged communities, there is no alternative 
but to attempt to challenge, adapt or change institutions if the organizational mission is to 
be achieved. 
Interrogating my Keystone experience through the conceptual lens of institutional and 
organizational work highlighted that my approach to social innovation combined mutually 
reinforcing organizational and institutional work with socio-economic interventions:  
 
Figure 4.1 Mutually reinforcing approach to social innovation 
Reflecting on Chapter 4, the key features of each element are outlined below:  
  
Organizational 
Work
Socio‐economic 
interventions
Institutional 
Work
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 Key Features  
 
Examples (European Migrants) 
 
Organizational 
Work 
Investigate   Fieldwork and research 
Formulate  Dialogue with migrants 
Secure internal legitimacy  Inform and persuade 
Secure resources  Bend existing and bid 
Deploy and manage, monitor  
Monitor and evaluate  
 
Institutional 
Work 
Understand Migrant institutions, impact on host 
community institutions; institutional conflict 
and potential bridges. 
 Fieldwork, dialogue and research 
Challenge/ disrupt Host institutions; attitudes to migration. 
Migrants’ attitudes towards UK institutions. 
 ‘Workers on the Move’ series 
 Evidence to commissions 
 Media engagement  
 Forums and presentations 
 Direct challenge to individuals and 
agencies 
 Myth-busting 
Bridge/shape/amend Modify discourses, locate common ground 
 Cultural interaction 
 Cultural awareness courses for agencies 
Change/ create Change or create new discourses 
 Benefits of migration 
 Migration as normal and routine 
 
Socio-
economic 
Interventions 
 
Projects   Multiple local and regional projects for 
migrants 
 Integration projects 
 Ensure migrant access to services i.e. 
GPs 
 
Table 4.1: Key features of mutually reinforcing work 
 
By incorporating the above within Boyd’s OODA loop, the process looks like this; 
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Figure 4.2: Process model  
The paradoxes inherent in the Trust’s work, as well as the local context, have led to 
sustained institutional work to achieve mission. While organizations simultaneously 
undertake institutional and organizational work and interventions, the Keystone experience 
is that action has been phased, at least initially (1-3 above). During each phase more 
observation, orientation and decision making occurs before further action.  
Building an organization on the fault lines required intensive and simultaneous internal 
organizational and institutional work before embarking on coherent socio-economic 
interventions. For instance, organizational work took place securing resources for property 
development and the institutional work around challenging internal stakeholders’ norms of 
charitable activities. In delivering the socio-economic interventions, the institutional work 
became more externally focused. The operation of META’s advice service led to sustained 
disruption and challenge to community and agency attitudes to European migration. 
Orientate
Institutions
Context
History
Previous experience
Decide
Act
1.Organizational & internal
Institutional Work
2.Social/Econonic 
interventions
Organizational Work 
(delivery & learning)
3.External Institutional 
Work
Observe
issues & institutions
New information
Unfolding 
circumstances
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Learning from experience, the organization then re-oriented and modified or intensified its 
action accordingly. 
The model provides a useful explanatory framework for the processes that organizations 
undertake. Further observations are that, as the context becomes more complex or 
challenging, institutional work in particular intensifies. It also intensifies if significant 
resistance is encountered, such as organizational stigma and challenges to legitimacy. Such 
work occurs at field, environment, organizational and actor levels and is often 
simultaneous. I believe the model captures our organizational experience and makes a 
contribution to the literature. 
The literature on place-based entrepreneurial third sector organizations focuses on 
responses to market and state failure. It often assumes that social enterprise can ameliorate 
failure or create alternatives through fusing logics. This is a theoretical proposition for 
which the evidence is far from convincing. Quite apart from the challenges resulting from 
the dominant tension of dual goals compounded by place, many organizations lack the 
resources reach on the scale necessary to make a fundamental impact. The impact tends to 
be localized and closely aligned with public policy and cash. This is not to decry the 
immense commitment and contribution to local wellbeing. Rather, it reflects the continued 
power of state isomorphic pressures. However, as localized pluralistic organizations 
negotiating multiple logics and the problems of legitimacy, governance and change (Kraatz 
and Block, 2008), they do provide useful sites for an improved understanding of the micro-
processes of institutional pluralism. Moreover, as the state retreats and new pluralistic 
organizations are created in response, there is a pressing need for further research, theory 
building and dissemination.  
Reflecting on my earlier attempts to problematize the Trust model and adapting, repairing 
and remodelling concepts (Boxenbaum and Rouleau, 2011), contingent ‘innovative 
reconciliations’ (De Wit and Meyer, 2004: 2004: 15) were made to the paradoxes driven 
by learning, belonging, organizing and performing tensions (Smith and Lewis 2011). 
Initially I focused on the paradoxes created by fusing market and community logics and 
proposed ways to reconcile them organizationally and contributed to wider discourses. In 
retrospect I would suggest that localized pluralistic organizations also incorporate aspects 
of a public logic; especially as the state retreats and isomorphic pressures to take on public 
services, provide space for democratic engagement or enabling networks intensify. While 
not necessarily a progressive or sustainable development, it does create new tensions and 
complexities. An outcome of this professional doctorate is a commitment to explore further 
the theme of local pluralistic organizations. 
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In summary, the institutional work literature has proved particularly useful in framing and 
reflecting upon experience and the creation of a mutually reinforcing model of work and 
interventions that captures the key processes of the development of Keystone as a public 
work. 
Moving forward 
The Doctorate in Professional Studies has provided an opportunity to reflect critically on 
the Keystone journey, and my role in particular. Preparing the submission has allowed me 
to revisit our history and think critically about the choices made as we struggled with the 
paradoxical tensions and our social and economic impact. It has also facilitated critical 
reflection on the whole of my career and how my leadership style has evolved. 
I feel privileged to have been given considerable scope for action over the nine years. I felt 
it important that Sheila Childerhouse (founding Trust Chair) and Pat Pearson (current 
Chair), who have had immense faith in my leadership, had an opportunity to comment on 
the submission. Both felt that it accurately reflects the Keystone journey and provides a 
timely reflexive critique on which to build future work. Pat found that the submission 
helped him better understand my influences and approach to leadership. Sheila suggested 
that I have underplayed the intense ‘fire fighting’ of the early years. While I hope I have 
summarized the organizational and institutional work setting up the Trust 2003-04, I 
believe it merits further attention. I would hope to return to the issues surrounding the 
foundation of organizations on the fault lines of institutional logics in subsequent work on 
pluralistic organizations and leadership. On re-reading the submission, Sheila added:  
I am struck still by how your retrospective telling of the KDT story gives clarity 
and a shape that at the time was hard to see. It did feel like fire fighting! However, 
the fact that the organization has been sustainable is down to your leadership, the 
quality of which we have been immensely fortunate to have, and the strategic 
clarity you have brought to the Trust’s development.  
You are right to comment that the academic work you have undertaken has added 
much to the Trust and people of the area as well as to yourself.58 
I feel privileged to lead an organization that prioritizes social justice and action. In writing 
this submission I have realized how important it is that my values resonate with the 
organization I work for and to be close enough to everyday practice to see the results of 
our collective efforts on the lives of the people we serve. I recognize that being ‘up close 
and personal’ is important for my own motivation and sense of self-worth; making a 
difference is not purely altruistic.  
                                                            
58 Email dated 6/8/12. 
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Perhaps the most important questions that preparing this submission has raised are whether 
we have lived up to the expectations of our stakeholders and are doing enough. In terms of 
organizational longevity we have confounded our local critics. I believe, on balance, we 
have fulfilled our mission within the limits of the resources available. Financial austerity is 
impacting on the Trust’s ability to meet rising needs, which is both alarming and 
frustrating. While I recognize that access to resources is crucial for doing more, I am 
driven by a sense we are never doing enough. I would suggest that what drives social 
innovators is this sense of inadequacy in the face of social need. 
I would also suggest that in leadership doubt is strength, although certainty is what leaders 
are usually expected to provide. Doubt can protect individuals and organizations from 
complacency and hubris. It can also drive innovation, as I hope this submission has 
demonstrated. If anything, preparing for a Doctorate of Professional Studies has 
reinvigorated my motivation to engage critically with the doubt and uncertainty that 
pluralist organizations and leaders confront.  
In the constant struggle to sustain social action, promoting an organization or a model is 
often of paramount importance. Practitioner and organizational stories invariably focus on 
success rather than uncertainty, doubt and failure. We tend to leave critiques to the 
academic community. While Keystone has done its fair share of self-promotion, in 
revisiting our work I have been struck by how the doubt and uncertainty over working the 
fault lines of institutional logics has created a culture of adaption and innovation as well as 
critique. I believe we have faced up to the ‘awkward realities’ (Patton, 2004: 37) and 
engaged in sustained internal and external discourses to problematize and learn from our 
and others experiences: in other words, worrying out loud. I have also been struck by how 
relationships with academia have enhanced the Trust’s and my ability continually to reflect 
and adapt. I hope that this professional doctorate will provide a springboard for further 
engaged scholarship. 
I am being considered as the first social entrepreneur in residence for the Judge Business 
School, University of Cambridge. If accepted, I intend to raise the profile of social 
innovation and entrepreneurship with the facility and postgraduate students through 
contributing to teaching. I hope to organize seminars to bring practitioners and academics 
together to explore ideas around pluralistic organizations and the increasing need for any 
organization to encourage pluralistic leadership. I am also being considered as a Visiting 
Fellow of the Third Sector Futures initiative at the Lord Ashcroft International Business 
School, Anglia Ruskin University.  
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In conclusion, the professional doctorate has allowed me critically to reflect on my 
experience and provided insights into my practice and motivations, insights which I hope 
to explore further through academic work, as well as fuelling continual professional 
development. It has also led to renewed efforts to ensure Keystone Development Trust can 
meet the challenges ahead (including succession), continue to contest institutions which 
impact on beneficiaries and to contribute to practitioner and policy discourses.  
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Appendices 
i:  Public works  
The majority of the evidence submitted for assessment is in the public realm. There are 
number of internal reports which were originally confidential but released for submission 
by the Keystone’s Trustees. To demonstrate the dissemination of learning and impact, the 
assessors also received a selection of confidential consultancy reports with the client’s 
permission. 
a. Publications and documents (public)59 
Carney, C. 2004a. Thetford Profile. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/common/pdfs/thetfordprofile.pdf 
Carney, C .2004b. Brandon Profile. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/common/pdfs/brandonprofile.pdf 
Carney, C .2004c. Health and the Portuguese Community: A pilot study. Keystone 
Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/common/pdfs/healthportuguesecomm.pdf 
Carney, C .2004d. Keystone Profile. 2nd edn. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/common/pdfs/keystoneprofile2ndedition.pdf 
Carney, C. 2005. Youth Speaks. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/common/pdfs/youthspeaks.pdf 
Collis, A., Stott, N. and Ross, D. 2010a. Workers on the Move 2: European migrant 
workers and health in the UK: A Review of the Issues. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/120.pdf 
Collis, A., Stott, N. and Ross, D. 2010b. Workers on the Move 3: European migrant 
workers and health in the UK: Research briefing. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/122.pdf 
Collis, A., Stott, N. and Ross, D. 2010c. Workers on the Move 3: European migrant 
workers and health in the UK: The evidence. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/121.pdf 
                                                            
59 Some reports were classified confidential at the time. The Board has given permission for release into the 
public realm. 
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Collis, A., Stott, N., Crozier R. and Martin, K. 2011. Work Matters: Work, worklessness 
and community: A review of the issues. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/131.pdf 
KDT. 2003a. ‘Developing Keystone’. Board report 20.3.03. 
KDT. 2003b. Land and building acquisition. Board report 20.3.03. 
KDT. 2003c. Minutes of the Joint Keystone Community Partnership and Interim Board. 
KDT. 2003d. Keystone endowment plan notes. 
KDT. 2003e. Developing Keystone – six month review. 
KDT. 2004a. Annual Report 2003-04. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/70.pdf 
KDT. 2004b. Trust Strategic Development Plan 2004-2008 
KDT. 2004c. KDT: A community Regeneration Charity. PowerPoint presentation to the 
Board. 
KDT. 2004d. Trust sustainability. Board report 13/704. 
KDT. 2004e. Income generation for development trusts. 
KDT. 2005. Annual Report 2005. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/71.pdf 
KDT.2005b Information pack for European migrants (English version) 
KDT. 2006a. Annual Report 2006. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/72.pdf 
KDT 2006b. What Has Keystone Done for Us? 
KDT. 2007. Annual Report 2007 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/73.pdf 
KDT. 2007b. Trust Business Plan. 
KDT. 2008. Annual Report 2008 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/74.pdf 
KDT. 2008b. Trust Business Plan. 
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KDT. 2009. Annual Report 2009. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/76.pdf 
KDT.2009b. Trust Business Plan. 
KDT. 2010. Annual Report 2010. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/109.pdf 
KDT. 2011. Annual Report 2011. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/178.pdf 
KDT. 2011b. Developing a transformation strategy. Board report 27/9/11. 
Mobbs, J., Stott, N., Tett, E. and Tracy, P. 2011. Raising Employment Aspirations and 
Expectations Among Young People in Suffolk: The Aspirations Escalator Project. 
Keystone Development Trust and Suffolk County Council. 
Patterson, M., Stott, N. and Tracey, P. 2011. Supporting Volunteers: The Keystone 
approach. KDT. 
Pinto, E. 2005. Portuguese Community Needs Interviews. Keystone Development Trust 
Views. http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/common/pdfs/portuguesecommneedsreport.pdf 
Schneider, C. and Holman, D. 2005. A Profile of Migrant Workers in the Breckland Area: 
Summary report. Keystone Development Trust and Anglia Ruskin University. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/common/pdfs/profileofmigrantworkersinbreckland.pdf 
Stott, M, Stott, N. and Wiles, C. 2009. Learning from the Past? Building community in 
New Towns and growth areas .Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/118.pdf 
Stott, M. 2011. The Big Society Challenge. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/128.pdf 
Stott, N. 2002. Leading the Trust; making a difference. Presentation. 
Stott, N. 2008. ‘Eco towns can thrive with trusts’. Regeneration and Renewal. 
http: //www.regen.net/Community_Renewal/article/799493/Eco-towns-thrive-trusts/ 
Stott, N. 2009. Managing Financial Risk. SEEE.  
http: //seeewiki.co.uk/~wiki/images/9/90/ 
Managing_Financial_Risk__Keystone_Development_Trust_.pdf 
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Stott, N. and Arias, R. 2002. Breaking down barriers to better services. Presentation. 
Canterbury City Council. 
Stott, N. and Longhurst, N. 2011. Big Society, poor places. In M. Stott (Ed.), The Big 
Society Challenge. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/128.pdf 
Stott, N. and Tracey, P. 2007. Between a rock and a hard place? Exploring the strategic 
tensions experienced by development trusts. Journal of Finance and Management in 
Public Services, 6, 2. 
http: //www.cipfa.org.uk/thejournal/download/jour_vol6_no3_c.pdf 
Stott, N., Tracey, P. and Swaine, T. 2004. Development Trusts: The essentials. KDT. 
Wiles, C., Stott, N., Holman, D., Schneider, C. and Collis, A. 2008. Workers on the Move: 
Migrant workers, growth and housing in the eastern region. Keystone Development Trust. 
http: //www.keystonetrust.org.uk/documents/20.pdf 
Tracey, P. 2012c. Report to the Board of Keystone Development Trust. January 25th. 
Tracey, P., Stott, N. and Patterson, A. 2011. Supporting Those Furthest from the Labour 
Market: The Keystone Approach. Keystone Development Trust. 
 
b. Films 2009-2012 
An Introduction to the Keystone Development Trust. 2010. Asset Transfer Unit. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=mBIv1TuN4f8&feature=relmfu 
Meet Keystone Development Trust. .2009 Asset Transfer Unit. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkdlRwF28KU&feature=relmfu 
Keystone Innovation Centre. 2010. Asset Transfer Unit. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=SjCKFPNSAWs 
Meet the META Team. 2009. Asset Transfer Unit. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=eTYcpK6J2WU 
Green Ventures Bike.2010.Asset Transfer Unit. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrwyWSN7-gk 
Green Ventures Bikes .2010. Thetford Healthy Town. 
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http: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=ELHamMQmotk 
Keystone Enterprise Factory. 2010. Asset Transfer Unit. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=BB_uB3GpAJo&feature=relmfu 
Abbey Neighbourhood Centre Improvements. 2009. Asset Transfer Unit. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=hPpe9SLz9nA 
Youth Activities. 2009. Keystone Development Trust. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=AYsGQizMcis 
Keystone Area Voluntary Organizations Support Network. 2010. Asset Transfer Unit. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=VO_cTvOVLUI 
Local Food Group and Joy of Food. 2009. Asset Transfer Unit. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=gIW_6w6ZZ7E 
The Joy of Food. 2011. Thetford Healthy Town. 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=6BHLqSgvauo 
Keystone Work Clubs. 2012. KDT. 
http: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=dA7F9dH0KQQ&feature=related 
Keystone Pupils with Prospects. 2012. KDT. 
http: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=egV_OFW3vOg&feature=related 
Keystone Volunteer to Work 2012. KDT. 
http: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=d63MMWvtmxE&feature=related 
Keystone Aspirations Project. 2012. KDT. 
http: //www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Z7AIul9yp4 
 
c. Confidential and consultancy reports (CD 2) 
Stott, N. 2006. London Borough of Newham Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour Service 
Review. LBN. 
Stott, N. 2008. Northstowe Community Trust: Consultant’s papers. DTA. 
Stott, N. 2008b. ‘Appendix 1 Constructive review report’. In Preliminary Finding Report: 
A feasibility study for the development of a CDT for Longbridge. DTA. 
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Stott, N. 2009. Flagship Housing Group and Community Engagement. Flagship Group and 
Keystone Development Trust. 
Stott, N. 2009b. West Middlesbrough Neighbourhood Trust: Advice note 1 & 4. DTA. 
Stott, N. 2011. Age UK Eastern region ‘Fit for Purpose’ review for Age UK Suffolk 
Locality. 
Stott, N. and Allison, M. 2011. The Place Makers: Final Report. Keystone Development 
Trust. 
Stott, N., Collis, A., Moore, S. and Tracey, P. 2007. Kent Youth Gatherings and Gangs: 
Discussion paper. Kent Police. 
Stott, N., Collis, A., Moore, S. and Tracey, P. 2009. Kent Youth Gatherings and Gangs: 
Full report. Kent Police. 
Stott, N. and Flack, A. 2010. Westwood and Ravensthorpe Development Trust Review. 
Peterborough City Council. 
Stott, M. and Stott, N. 2009. West Thetford Community Consultation. Flagship Group and 
Keystone Development Trust. 
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ii. Supporting evidence (CD1) 
Equalities newsletters 
Keystone Partner updates 2006-12 
Keystone Area Voluntary Organizations newsletters 
Press cuttings 2003-2007 (sample) 
 
External reports that Keystone features in or contributes to:  
Arradon, G. 2007. On the Borderline: development trusts tackling poverty in the UK. DTA. 
Audit Commission. 2007. Crossing Borders: Responding to the local challenges of 
migration. 
Commission on Integration and Cohesion. 2007a. Our Shared Future. 
Commission on Integration and Cohesion. 2007b. Case Studies. 
DTA. Bonds and Bridges: A practitioner guide to community diversity. DTA 
RICS. 2011. Land and Society Commission Report. Royal Institute for Chartered 
Surveyors. 
 
The following are links to a sample of recent press articles and websites featuring 
Keystone:  
Brain, M. 2011. Big Society and localism. Ipswich Society newsletter 
http: //www.ipswichsociety.org.uk/newsletter/dispart.php?issue=184&art=10 
Community master planning. Future Communities 
http: //www.futurecommunities.net/socialdesign/193/community-master-planning-needs-
be-flexible 
Gough, R. 2011. Positive signs of the Big Society in Thetford. Thetford and Brandon 
Times 
http: //www.thetfordandbrandontimes.co.uk/news/ 
positive_signs_on_the_big_society_in_thetford_1_857157 
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Gough, R. 2012. Pilot project to focus on alcohol impact in Thetford. Thetford and 
Brandon Times. 
http: //www.thetfordandbrandontimes.co.uk/news/ 
pilot_project_to_focus_on_alcohol_impact_in_thetford_1_1410942 
Haugh, H. 2011. Are social enterprises being set up to fail? Lancashire Community 
Recycling Network. 
http: //www.lancashirecrn.org/news/is-social-enterprise-being-set-up-to-fail/6/4/2011 
Haverhill Year 11 Work Club at Cambridge University. 
http: //www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/news/items/2012/120322_aspirations.html 
Thetford Healthy Town. July 30 2012, Eastern Daily Press. 
http: //www.edp24.co.uk/news/health/ 
thetford_healthy_town_project_to_continue_under_keystone_development_trust_1_14209
46 
JRF. 2011. Localism – friend or foe to infrastructure in new communities. Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. 
http: //www.jrf.org.uk/blog/2011/03/localism-friend-or-foe 
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iii. Stakeholder map 
 
Stakeholder Comments 
Charitable governance 
 Members 
 Trustees 
 ‘Friends of’ 
 Staff 
 Charity Commission 
 Company House 
 Auditors 
 
Charitable beneficiaries  Across one district council area plus two partial 
districts in Norfolk and Suffolk 
 
Particular focus on communities experiencing 
significant disadvantage such as; social housing 
estates, unemployed and young people 
Service users 
 European migrants 
 Unemployed adults 
 Young people at risk of being 
Not in Employment, Education 
or Training post year 11 
 Children and families 
 Credit union 
 Community centres 
 Community organizations  
 
Customers 
 Tenants 
 Retail (food and bikes) 
 Consultancy 
 Contracts 
 
Funders 
 Philanthropic trusts 
Funders at local, county, regional, national and 
European level 
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 Lottery 
 Public bodies 
Public bodies 
 Town and parish 
 District 
 County 
 Quangos 
 Government 
Multiple public bodies serve the charitable area and 
the Trust has multiple relationships with many such 
as; 
 Being in receipt of public funds 
 Delivering contracts 
 Membership of partnership groups 
 Joint project development 
 Membership of Boards 
Third sector Numerous groups serve the charitable area ( from 
national to a neighbourhood level) and the Trust has 
multiple relationships such as:  
 Providing grants 
 Providing non-financial support 
 Joint forums 
 Joint projects/ business development 
 Professional/sector networks 
Academic/Educational Partnership work with schools, academies and 
universities  
Private sector  Local business forums 
 Joint projects/ business development 
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iv. Curriculum vitae 
NEIL STOTT 
 Chief Executive of one of the largest development trusts in the UK since 2003 
 Senior Fellow of the Institute of Place Management (SFIPM) 
 Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts (FRSA) 
 DProf candidate, Middlesex University 
 MSt in Community Enterprise from the Judge Business School, Cambridge University (2005) 
EMPLOYMENT 
Dates Employer Responsibilities and achievements 
March 2003- 
2012 
 
 
Keystone 
Development 
Trust, Thetford, 
Norfolk 
 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
Strategic and operational management of a regeneration 
charity/development trust delivering; social, cultural, 
economic, environmental and physical regeneration in Norfolk 
and Suffolk.  
Key achievements; establishing the Trust, developing a 
business model and sustainability plan. Delivery of major 
capital projects, community projects and new social 
enterprises. Achieved 75% earned income from a baseline of 
99% public funding within four years. 
May 2000 – 
March 2003 
 
Canterbury City 
Council 
 
HEAD OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
Management of the Community Development Service 
including; Public Safety Service – Joint Council and Police 
community safety and anti-social behaviour team, diversity and 
equalities, Neighbourhood Wardens, Safer Community 
Partnership team. Neighbourhood Development Team – 
community regeneration, rural and coastal development, SRB 5 
& 6, Healthy Living, Neighbourhood centres teams. Children 
and Youth Service – Surestart, 511 (Children’s) team, Children 
and Youth Participation Team, Street (detached) Team, 
Children’s Fund Team. Business and Research Unit – Voluntary 
Sector Support Team, Parish Council support, Concessionary 
bus permits, community audit/visioning, community planning. 
Partnership, corporate and project management 
Key achievements: establishment of the Community 
Development Service from ‘scratch’). £9.6m external funding 
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secured 2000-2006.Local Government Association 
‘Pathfinder’ status for preventative work with 5-13 year olds 
and families. Joint Council/Police community safety service. 
1990-2000 Cambridge City 
Council 
 
PRINCIPAL COMMUNITY SERVICES OFFICER 
Neighbourhood Community Development and Centres Team 
(including 4 community centres and 5 Joint-use school-based 
community centres), Race Equality Team, Youth Development 
Team, Racial Harassment Team, Tenant Participation and 
neighbourhood community planning. 
Key achievements; Young Citizens Jury and innovative young 
person led youth participation programme, Racial Harassment 
Public Inquiry, community centre development programme. 
1988-1990 Cambridge City 
Council 
 
SENIOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT OFFICER 
Neighbourhood Community Development Service 
Key achievements; new community centre development, 
investment in priority wards, training and development of local 
people as community development workers. 
1987-1988 
 
Cambridge City 
Council 
 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT OFFICER 
Neighbourhood work in priority ward and centre management 
Key achievements – community led children and family 
projects culminating in the establishment of a local children’s 
charity. 
1985–1987 
 
Contact-a-
Family, London 
 
PROJECT MANAGER/ COMMUNITY WORKER 
Families with children with special needs – development and 
support to projects in Lewisham and Lambeth – advice, 
information, events, play schemes, fundraising, parents groups. 
Key achievements; innovative work with siblings, youth club 
integration and with parents on sex. 
1984-1985 
 
Mencap, 
London 
PROJECT MANAGER – WANDSWORTH MENCAP 
RELIEF CARE SCHEME 
Community-based relief scheme for carers of children with 
special needs. 
1984-1985 Elfrida 
Rathbone 
YOUTH WORKER 
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 Society, 
Wandsworth 
Part -time youth work with young people with special needs. 
1984 
 
Elfrida 
Rathbone 
Society, 
Wandsworth 
OUTREACH WORKER 
Outreach programme from a drop-in centre for adults with 
learning difficulties. 
1982 
 
South Lakeland 
Council for 
Voluntary 
Action 
COMMUNITY WORKER 
Development of an unemployed centre (placement year). 
1985-1987 
 
Elfrida 
Rathbone 
Society, 
Wandsworth 
Management Committee member (voluntary). 
1977–1979 
 
Dr Barnardo’s, 
Kendal 
RESIDENTIAL CARE WORKER 
Relief residential care for children and young people with 
severe special needs. Initially part-time voluntary work – full-
time residential, post-A levels.  
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Institution Qualification Date(s) Grade/Level  
Middlesex University DProf by Public Works 2010-2012  
 
School of Arts, Brunel 
University 
PhD 2006 – in 
abeyance 
 
Judge Business 
School, Cambridge 
University 
MSt in Community 
Enterprise 
2003-2005 
 
Masters 
Anglia Ruskin 
University 
Postgraduate Certificate in 
Sociology and Politics 
1999-2000  
(award 2003) 
Postgraduate 
Certificate 
(Distinction) 
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Cambridge University 
Extra Mural 
Certificate in Archaeology  1997-1999 Level 1 credits (60) 
Roehampton College Certificate in Group Work 1985–1986 Pass 
Bradford University BA (Hons) Peace Studies 1981–1984 
(including work 
placement year) 
2: 2 
 
Van Mildert College, 
Durham University 
Preliminary Honours in 
Sociology, Politics, 
economic history and 
anthropology 
1979–1980 
 
First 
 
Heversham School, 
Cumbria 
Advanced Level 1978 B, B, C, C 
Heversham School, 
Cumbria 
Ordinary Level 1976 10 O Levels 
 
RECENT PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIP, POSITIONS AND DIRECTORSHIPS 
 Senior Fellow of the Institute of Place Management (SFIPM) 2008 onwards 
 Locality ‘Ambassador’ 2012 
 Chair, Thetford Healthy Town 2012 
 Visiting Research Fellow of Anglia Ruskin University 2007- 2012 
 Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts (FRSA) – 2006 onwards 
 Member of the Joseph Rowntree Foundation Community Assets Programme Advisory 
Network and Housing and Migration group 2009 -2011(with Hact) 
 EEDA Regional Migrant Worker Executive and Advisory Group 2006 onwards 
 Locality/Development Trust Association Eastern Region – Chair 2004 onwards 
 Breckland Pride Board (previously the LSP) 2012 
 Breckland Local Strategic Partnership – Board Member 2009-2012 
 Fellow of the Inter –University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS) 
 Member of the Institute of Economic Development 2005-2009 
 National Community Forum (DCLG) member 2008-2010 
 DTA National Policy Committee 2005-2007; National Poverty Working Group 2005-2007 
 East of England Equality and Diversity Advisory Group (Learning and Skills Council) 2007-
2009 
 Director of HALO Development Trust, Harlow 2008 
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 Social Enterprise East of England – Director 2005-2008 
 Social Firms East – Director 2005-2007 
 Audit Commission Migrant Worker Advisory Group 2005-2006 
 Local Government Association Advisor on Community Development to the Members group, 
joint LGA/National Voluntary Sector Forum and Central Local Partnership Sub-Group on 
Social Inclusion 2002-2003 
 Kent Children’s Fund and Canterbury Children’s Partnership – Board Member. 
CONSULTANCY 
 Senior Associate – ‘The Pool’ Locality  
 Principal Consultant; Keystone Research and Consultancy 
TEACHING/MENTORING 
 Ariane de Rothschild Fellowship 2011 (Judge Business School) visiting lecturer and business 
planning mentor 
 Judge Business School MBA mentor 2009 and 2010 
 Anglia Ruskin University Visiting lecturer on the BA (Social Policy) 2008-2010 
 Anglia Ruskin University Visiting lecturer on the Social Enterprise Executive Education 
programme 2009 
 University of Cambridge Management and Strategy Module on the Certificate of Continuing 
Education (Social Enterprise Management) 2006. 
PUBLICATIONS 
Tracey, P. and Stott, N. Forthcoming. Workers on the Move 4; Migration, dirty work and 
exploitation. Keystone Development Trust. 
Stott, N. 2011. Big Society, poor places. In M. Stott (Ed.), The Big Society Challenge. Keystone 
Development Trust. 
Collis, A., Stott, N., Crozier R. and Martin, K. 2010-2011. Work Matters: Work, worklessness and 
community: A review of the issues .Keystone Development Trust. 
Collis, A., Stott, N. and Ross, D. 2010. Workers on the Move 3: European migrant workers and 
health in the UK. Keystone Development Trust. 
Stott, N. 2010. Anticipating military work: digital games as a source of anticipatory socialization? 
Paper presented at the 5th Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association 
working group on US foreign policy, Leeds University, 15 September 2010.  
Collis, A., Stott, N. and Ross, D. 2010. .Workers on the Move 2: European migrant workers and 
health in the UK: A Review of the Issues. Keystone Development Trust. 
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Stott, M, Stott, N. and Wiles, C. 2009 Learning from the Past? Building community in New Towns 
and growth areas. Keystone Development Trust. 
Wiles, C., Stott, N., Holman, D. Schneider, C. and Collis, A. 2008. Migrants on the Move; Migrant 
Workers, Growth and Housing in the Eastern Region. Keystone Development Trust. 
Stott, N. and Tracey, P. 2007. Between a rock and a hard place? Exploring the strategic tensions 
experienced by development trusts. Journal of Finance and Management in Public Services, 6, 3. 
http://www.academia.edu/530011/Between_a_rock_and_a_hard_place_Exploring_the_strategic_te
nsions_experienced_by_development_trusts 
